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INTRODUCTION
Deep Sea Bed Mining has been a topic of considerable debate
since it became technically and economically viable as a mining
venture in the mid 1960's.

The availability of manganese nodules

has been determined through costly "prospecting" operations and
their existence in sufficient quantity and quality has been
found to be , adequate for the mining industry . . The means by
which the industry will recoyer the nodules has been limited
to three current designs.

A continuous line of buckets seems

to be the simplest method in terms of capital outlay and ease
of maintenance.

The use of a suction lift seems to be the most

widespread design due to its relative ease of operation; however,
it requires a much larger capital investment and much higher
maintenance costs.

The newest design (touted by a French Con-

sortium) has been one which employs remotely controlled drones.
They are released on the surface, "swim" to the bottom, scoop
up a load of nodules and return to the surface where their load
is received by the parent vessel.
The processing of the nodules \vill be an expensive operation
compared to processing costs of current ores obtained from the
land sites.

Recent developments and innovations in the leaching

process have served to reduce the cost somewhat.

The processing

costs may be reduced by technological breakthrough in the future,
but they cannot be predicted.
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The capital outlays which must be made by industry in order
to proceed with deep sea mining is staggering.

Prior to moving

ahead with their investment, members of the industry Hould like
to ensure that they will in fact be allowed to capitalize on
the harvesting of manganese nodules.

This point is the subject

of heated debate in the ongoing United Nations Convention for
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations.

One of the many

points covered by UNCLOS is the ownership of the nodules and
who will be allowed to exploit them.

With this item undecided,

industry has turned to the U.S. Government for assistance and
has found some consolation in the form of the Hard Minerals Act
(passed by the Carter administration) which is pushing the U.N.
Nego~iations

towards a more timely settlement.

In addition,

the Reagan administration has instructed the U.S. delegation
not to complete the treaty until a new policy review takes place
to determine whether the new draft offers the industry access
to the nodules on fair and reasonable terms.
In addition to its attrative appeal to the ocean mining
industry, the processing of manganese nodules will offer the
U.S. mineral independence in three of the four major metals
found in the nodules.

This will reduce the probability of

economic action against the U.S. by mineral cartels similar
to those actions taken by OPEC and Alumina/Bauxite producers.
The minerals associated with manganese nodule mining are considered to be strategic minerals.

5

They are used throughout

'.
the defense industry and more alarmingly, with the exception of
copper~

we rely heavily on imports from politically unstable

regions of the world.
Although deep sea bed mining has tremendous economic and
political advantages, we must bear in mind that it is only part
of the current UNCLOS negotiations and its merit must be weighed
with other

impo~t~nt

issues.

To sacrifice the negotiations for

one issue alone would be tragic and could inflict irrepairable
damage upon the U.N. as a negotiating body and upon all countries
depending on the freedom of the oceans for trade, transportation
and resources.
"In the meantime, the new industry of deep ocean mining lands
in a political limbo.

It moves tentatively forward only on the

strength of the new federal law, knowing that a U.N. treaty could
later drive the business beyond hope of return.

Whether nodules

will ever be collected will likely remain unanswered for some
time.
In a world of shortages and rising expectations, there will
always be a new technological horizon.

The history of nodule

mining, however, shows that future industries must fit into an
increasingly complex environmental and political order that is
itself a frontier effort.

Clever technology alone may no longer

solve the world's problems."l

IJanet L. Hopson, "Miners are Reaching for Met a I Riches on
the Ocean's Floor." Smithsonian, April 1981, p. 58.

6

Though the future of the nodule mining is undetermined, it
is the· purpose of this paper to determine its impact on the
national management of its associated strategic minerals and
national security.
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PART I
STRATEGIC MINERALS
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CHAPTER 1:

STOCKPILING STRATEGIC MINERALS

Since 1946 the U.S. has maintained stockpiles of strategic
materials sufficient in size to ensure the availability of
essential minerals in the event of war.

"Ostensibly limited

to use during national wartime emergencies, the strategic
stockpiles are intended to assure adequate critical mineral
supplies during -periods of stringencies.

The very existence

of the U.S. strategic stockpile program has also provided some
preemptive protection against administered price increases and
politically motivated shortages."l
The stockpile program originated in the Strategic and
Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1946.

The passage of

this act seems to have been a direct result of shortages and
severances of essential materials during World War II.

With

WWI I fresh in everyone's mind, the act wa s wr i t ten in an effort.
to reduce or prevent a reoccurrence of these shortages.

The

act, as it appears in SO U.S.C. 98, says:
"That the natural resources of the United States in certain
strategic and critical materials being deficient or insufficiently
developed to supply the industrial, military and Naval needs of
the country for common defense, it is the policy of the Congress

IJames A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral
Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma. The Washington Papers Volume
VII No. 70 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1979),
p. 39.
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and the purpose and intent of this act to provide for the
acquisition and retention of stocks of these materials and
to encourage the conservation and development of sources of
these materials within the United States, and thereby decrease
and prevent wherever possible a dangerous and costly dependence
of the United States upon foreign nations for supplies of these
materials in times of national emergency (emphasis added) .. "
In 1950~ the passage of the Defense Production Act was
intended to provide wide ranging authority and definite powers
for expanding the nations production capabilities.

It includes

arrangements for the purchase of strategic materials and supports
the mining of essential minerals.

The policy established by

this act is stated in 50 U.S.C. 2062 and follows:
"In view of the present international situation and in order
to provide for the national defense and national security, our
mobilization effort continues to require some diversion of
certain materials and facilities from civilian use to military
and related purposes.

It also requires the development of pre-

paredness programs and the expansion of productive capacity and
supply beyond the levels needed to meet the civilian demand, in
order to reduce the time required for full mobilization in the
event of an attack on the United States."
Stockpile objectives and actual levels were kept secret by
the Executive Branch up until 1962.

Since that time examinations

by Congress have shown such irregular variations in the objective

10

levels that there appears to have been reasons other than
national security for those changes.

The period of 1963-1973

resulted ln major fluctuations in the level of the stockpile
due chiefly to the high usage rate of strategic minerals
during the Vietnam War era.
In 1973, the stockpiles were in less than an ideal condition.
Several mineralsw~re liquidated and the administration decided
to reduce the stockpile objectives to those necessary to support
a one year military contingency, or rather, an orderly mobilization of the national economy for the duration of the conflict.
With this in mind, it is easy to understand the complexity of
factors which determine the size of each minerals stockpiles
objective.

Those minejals which have no substitutes or whose

supply lines are less than dependable would require a much
larger reserve than one which is easily and dependably obtained.
Due to a great deal of congressional criticism concerning
the condition of the stockpile, the Ford administration
initiated an extensive review of this policy in 1975.

Based

on the results of the inter-agency review, chaired by the
Federal Preparedness Agency of the GSA, the stockpiles 'vere
returned to a 3 year contingency level and included both civilian and defense needs.
The Carter administration set an additional requirement
that the u.S. must be able to support a 1 year NATO war in
Europe on not more than a 30 day notice.

11

This change has
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caused an extensive review of current stores in the area of
quality more than quantity.

The short 'time frame required

here demands an increased availability of finished metals
rather than the availability of unprocessed ore s.
Most recently, the national stockpiles have been the sources
of considerable campaign rhetoric during the 1980 presidential
campaign.

The major focus was on the growing dependence of

the United States on minerals supplied by small African countries whose reliability as a continuing source is questionable.
This controversy resulted in the Materials Policy, Research and
Development Act of 1979.

"The bill requires the president to

return to Congress ... a plan for implementing and establishing
a national minerals policy and promoting industrial innovations
in materials technology.

The Defense Department within the

same year must submit a list of critical materials needs
related to national security,"Z
This most recent turn of events has expressed an under
current of tense awareness of the criticality of minerals supplied by foreign countries and our inability to control these
supplies.

This situation is supporting the call for increased

stockpiles as we are trying to ensure against interruptions
of critical supplies as a result of intentional or unintentional
actions.

The formation of OPEC as a viable oil cartel, the

Z"Minerals Emerge As Campaign Issue,"
Technology, October ZO, 1980, p. 115.

lZ

Aviation Week

& Space

actions of aluminum producers

impos~ng

substantial export taxes

and the political unrest in undeveloped countries have jointly
undermined our confidence in maintaining an uninterrupted
supply of critical/strategic minerals.

13
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CHAPTER 2:

MINERAL DEPENDENCE

Of- the 24 major non-fuel minerals required by
the

u.s.

industry~

is less than 30% self sufficient in 21 of them.

trary to popular opinion the

u.s.

Con-

imports approximately two

thirds of its minerals from industrialized countries.

This

number in itself is encouraging as the industrialized countries represent · a stability and reliability of · supply.

Un-

fortunately, very few of the critical minerals are obtained
from these dependable countries.

Many of the more necessary

minerals must be obtained from less reliable sources.
The reliability of the less developed countries varies a
great deal and many are not very reliable at all.

In 1976

there was a considerable number of problems experienced internally in Zaire and Zambia wh i ch resul ted in a "cutoff" of
approximately 8 percent of the \.,-orld's cobalt supply and
delayed ongoing improvements to their production capabilities.
This resulted in less cobalt and increased prices.

"The price

rise in cobalt alone caused, for example, price increases for
the FIOO engine (jet) of almost S18,000., the J79 engine,
$21,000., and TF39~ $21,000.1'1
This example encouraged a careful review of worldwide
materials availability and vulnerability.

A relatively small

lClarence A. Robinson, "Defense Science Board Urges Multiyear Contracts. I ' Aviation \~eek & Space Technology, December 1
1980, p. 132.
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number of materials emerged on "most vulnerable" lists produced
by several independent studies.

"In nine such surveys, aluminum,

chromium and manganese appeared on seven lists.
tin and titanium appeared on six lists."Z

Cobalt, nickel,

From these surveys,

nine non-fuel minerals were identified as being most critical.
They are:

manganese, aluminum, nickel, tungsten, copper, cobalt,

platinum, chromium and tin, and their sources are illustrated in
Figure 1.
"The U.S. problem ... is intensifed by the fact that world
reserves are highly concentrated in key cases.

Only 3 countries

control over two thirds of five of the key minerals:

96.5% of

chromium, 90.5% of manganese, 99.7% of platinum, 74.6% of tungsten,
69.4% of nickel, and 69% of cobalt.

Only two ... South Africa and

the USSR have ... dominance in platinum and manganese ... it is
noteworthy that for these ... key minerals dominated by two suppliers, the U.S. has extremely high import dependence, 95% for
platinum and 98% for manganese .. "3
The substitutability of minerals is not always an option
and certainly not a possibility in a short time frame notification of massive requirements from industry.

With growing concern

over political stability of mineral rich countries and possible

ZJames A. Jordan and Robert A. Kilmarx, Strategic Mineral
Dependence: The Stockpile Dilemma. The Washington Papers,
Volume VII No. 70, (Beverly Hills and London:
Sage Publications,
1979), p . ZO.
3 I b i d., p . 17.
15
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FIGURE 1:

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF fllINERAL RESOURCES

fu~OS A. JORDAN AND ROBERT A. KIL~~RX, STRATEGIC
SOURCE:
THE
MINERAL DEPENDENCE:
THE STOCKP ILE DI LE}'L\1J\.
WASHINGTON PAPERS VOL VII, NO. 70, . (BEVERLY HILLS AND
LONDON:
SAGE PUBLICATIONS, 1979) ," pp. 21-22.
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cartel action by 3rd world countries, the industrialized countries
are searching for new sources of minerals.
Political conflict in Zaire and Zambia (combined they control
42% of the world's cobalt) reduced the world's cobalt supply
temporarily.

Political upheaval or sanctions imposed on South

Africa could seriously reduce the supply of manganese (45%),
platinum (71%) or chromium (74%), to name only the more critical
of their resources.

One of the more right wing approaches also

addresses the U.S.S.R's long term plan to gain control of the
world's minerals through political upheaval or armed conflict
in an effort to control the industrial capabilities of the west.
Regardless of the method used, the possibility of reduced
supply of essential minerals exists.

One source of minerals

which is available to the industrialized nations is the sea beds
of the world's oceans.

The availability of manganese nodules is

still politically debatable but the economic opportunities are
enormous.

Considering that the

u.s.

is self sufficient in copper,

the possibility of reducing our mineral dependence in manganese,
nickel and cobalt is encouraging indeed.

Without even mentioning

the effect on our balance of payments, the mere fact that we can
become independent in 3 of the remaining 8 critical

rniner~ls

is

a cause for celebration.
The remainder of this report will concentrate on the capabilities of the proposed ocean mining industry and the effects
which it will have on strategic minerals and national defense.

17
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Several assumptions must necessarily be made.

The first is that

manganese nodule mining operation is limited by the shere complexity of its apparatus and resulting restrictions on maneuverability to being a peacetime industry only.
to defend a mining vessel against attack.
second assumption.

It would be impossible
This leads to the

In that this source would only be viable

during peacetime, the stockpiles would necessarily have to remain
at a high level, but a defense against cartel action could be
assumed.

The third assumption to be considered is the relative

unimportance of copper in this study as the U.S. is close to
self sufficiency in this mineral.

This yields a fourth assump-

tion that seems to be somewhat of a reversal of the intentions
of

th~

manganese nodule miners.

Although nickel seems to be

driving the economic intentions of the industry, the greatest
advantage nationally appears to be the alleviation of import
dependence in cobalt, manganese and nickel.

While the miners

have expressed little interest in processing the large amounts
of manganese, the loss of this import would in effect shut down
the U.S. steel industry.

18
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PART II
UNITED STATES' MINERAL POSTURE
OF

NICKEL
COPPER
COBALT
AND
MANGANESE
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CHAPTER 1:

CURRENT CONSUMPTION

The industries of the United States have relied heavily on
raw materials since their inception.

The demand for resources

has been increasing at a varying rate since the industrial
revolution established this country as a major producer of
fabricated goods . .~ As technology increased we found ourselves
searching for specialized resources which would enable us to
provide better quality products.
nodule

meta~s

The four major manganese

are relied on heavily by manufacturers o£ special-

ized products.

Manganese, for example, is used in the manufac-

ture of iron and steel.

It is used in the smelting process to

remove sulfur and maintain the purity of the product.

Nickel

is used in steel alloys requiring corrosion resistance' and high
strength.

Cobalt is used in jet engine parts required to with -

stand high temperature and to make machine tools due to its
extreme hardness when alloyed.

Copper is used in practically

all things electrical and in low temperature piping systems
requiring corrosion resistant properties.
Due to the specialized nature of the products in which these
minerals are used, it is not practicable to find substitutes for
these minerals.

As shown in Table 1, the consumption rate of

nickel is projected to increase at a rate of 3% annually through
the turn of the century.

This would increase our consumption

of nickel from a 1970 level of 311 mill ion pounds per year to
770 million pounds per year in the year 2000.

20

Although a great
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TABLE 1 .
CURRENT AND PROJECTED CONSUMPTION OF MINERALS BY THE U.S.
CONSUMPTION
NICKEL (1970)

311,400,000 LBS

(2000)

770,000,000 LBS

COPPER (1970)

1,572,000 SHORT TONS

(2000)

5,400,000 SHORT TONS

COBALT (1970)

16,140,000 LBS

(2000)

24,700,000 LBS

MANGANESE (1970)

1,327,000 SHORT TONS

(2000)

2,360,000 SHORT TONS

SOURCE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE MINING AND
MINERALS POLICY ACT OF 1970. (P.L. 91-631), (WASHINGTON
D.C.: U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972).

21

deal-of current imports are obtained from Canada, the increased
consumption levels are expected to be met in part by imports
from newly found deposits of higher grade ore in Australia
and several other South Pacific island nations.
The annual consumption of coppper as of 1970 was

1~572~000

short tons and is expected to increase at an annual rate of 3%
also.

By the year 2000 this represents a total consumption of

5,400,000 short tons of copper per year.

Although lve are

practically self sufficient ln copper production, we are increasing our imports due to lower grade ore in the U.S. as
compared to available imports, high labor costs and increasing
anti-pollution standards (estimated by the bureau of mines to
have increased the price of

u.s.

copper by 10%).1

The annual consumption of cobalt, estimated to be increasing
at an annual rate of 2.9%, was 16,190 thousand pounds in 1970
and will lncrease to 24,700 thousand pounds in the year 2000.
Although the total amount of cobalt used annually is somewhat
less than nickel and copper, it plays a very important part
in the

u.s.

efforts in technology.

Cobalt is used in many new

alloys required to provide higher strength metals under high
temperatures and pressures.

Efforts to increase production of

cobalt are complicated by the fact that cobalt is a by-product
of nickel and copper . . It is a very small percentage of these

IMinerals Yearbook, u.s. Bureau of Mines, Department of th e
Interior, (Washington, 1973).
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deposits, the richest (found in

contain a high of 2%

cobalt and average much less.
industry~

Manganese is an essential metal to the iron and steel
It is used to extract impurities from iron and steel.

U.S. con-

sumption of manganese was 1,327,000 short tons in 1970 and is .
estimated to increase at a rate of 1.7% annually, resulting in
a

~onsumptionof

2,360,000 short tons by the year 2000.

A

future increased availability of manganese is not expected
unless a discovery of a large deposit is made.

The U.S. is

extremely dependent on this resource and it is supplied to us
from six different countries.

Since South Africa and the USSR

hold 82% of the world reserves, the dependability of future
supplies is questionable.
The trend towards future increases in consumption yields
the need to obtain increased supplies.

As technology continues

to increase, more advanced alloys will be required to satisfy
increasing performance parameters as strengths, temperatures
and pressures increase in advanced systems.

As these alloys

are created, the current relative importance between minerals
may change to increase or decrease our dependence on foreign
sources; however, based on our best look into the future,
cobalt, manganese, nickel and copper will remain on the list
of critical minerals.

23

CHAPTER 2:

PRODUCTION AND IMPORTATION

In a report by the Commander of the Air Force Systems
Command, made to the House Armed Services Committee Industrial
Preparedness Panel, General Slay addressed U.S. dependence on
foreign mineral sources.

He said that "the country is more

than 50% dependent' on overseas sources for more than half of
approximately 4~ minerals described as most esSential to the
$2.3 trillion U.S. economy.

Some of these raw materials corne

from highly unstable areas of the world."l

Of the nine most

critical minerals, four of them may be obtained in varying
amounts by mining of manganese nodules from the deep sea bed.
The degree to which this new source is needed may best be
presented in a comparison of mineral imports versus domestic
production as a percentage of consumption.
As shown in Figure 2, the u.S. is totally dependent on
foreign supplies of cobalt and manganese.
these two minerals are various.
Gabon, South Africa and Zaire.

The sources of

Manganese comes from Brazil,
Cobalt is received from Zaire,

Belgium, Luxembourg, Finland, Canada and Norway.

Of these

sources, 53% of the world's manganese and 52% of the world's
cobalt come from states in southern Africa.

This emphasizes

the question of reliability of resources.

lClarence A. Robinson, "Defense Science Board Urges Multi-Year
Contracts." Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 1, 1980,
pp. 130 -133.
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FIGURE 2
U.S. NET IMPORT RELIANCE OF SELECTED l--lINERALS AND METALS
AS A PERCENT OF CONSUMPTION IN 1977
NET IMPORT RELIANCE AS A PERCENT
OF APPARENT CONSUMPTION
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SOURCE: AMOS A. JORDAN AND ROBERT A. KIL~~RX, STRATEGIC MINERAL
DEPENDENCE: THE STOCKPILE DILE~Th~. THE WASHINGTON PAPERS
VOL VII, NO . 70, (BEVERLY HILLS AND LONDON: SAGE PUBLICATIONS,
1979), pp. 21-22.
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U.S. has historically been self sufficient in copper

resources.

As shown in Table 2, we are projecting a much

greater usage than we will be able to supply.

This is due

primarily to escalating production costs in the U.S.

As a

result, we will be importing 65% of our copper in 1985 and
55% in the year 2000.

This represents 3,990,000 short tons

in 1985 and 3,020,000 short tons in 2000.

We are currently

relying on Canada, Peru and Chile for the small amount of
copper which we import.

As our consumption grows we will be

able to make up the majority of the difference with the neighbars in this hemisphere, but·an increasing amount will have to
come from other sources.
Nickel is available in U.S. deposits also but our available
reserves are quite small.

We imported 90% of our consumption

of this mineral in 1970, project an importation of 87% in 1985
and 88% In the year 2000.
Canada and Norway.

Our primary sources of nickel are

As our imports increase we can expect to

receive greater quantities from southern Africa and the South
Pacific islands.

The increases represent a yearly import.of

680,600,000 pounds of nickel by the year 2000.

27
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TABLE 2
COMPARISON OF U.S. DEMAND WITH U.S. PRODUCTION 1970, 1985, 2000
(UNITS IN THOUSANDS)

COBALT

1970

1985

2000

DEMfu~D/PRODUCTION

DEMAND/PRODUCTION

DE~l~ND/PRODUCTION

16,190 LBS/O

20,000 LBS/O

24,200 LBS/O

COPPER

1,572 ST/1,720 ST

2,900 ST/1,910 ST

5,400 ST/2,380 ST

MANGANESE

1,372 ST/66 ST

1,770 ST/O ST

2,360 ST/O ST

NICKEL

311,400 LB/30,600 LB

492,200 LB/60,000 LB 770,000 LB/84,900 LE

DATA FROM U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR UNDER THE MINING AND MINERALS
POLICY ACT OF 1970, (P.L. 91-631), (WASHINGTON D.C.: U.S.
G~VERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1972).
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PART III
DEEP SEA BED
MINING
OF
Mfu~Gk~ESE
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NODULES

-,

CHAPTER 1:

FEASIBILITY

The technology exists to "harvest" manganese nodules from
the deep sea bed.

Using one of several designs, a deep sea

mining vessel can obtain manganese nodules from 15,000 foot
depths and deposit this "catch" on a cargo vessel for transportation to, and processing at, a shore based refining/processing facility.

The technology is here and lacks only the

capital to proceed to the operational phase of the venture.
The economic aspect of the mining operation is, however,
much more complicated.

Of three major factors involved in the

economics of this project, the first, the fact that the majority
of the expense of this project lies in the land based operations,
is not generally recognized.

The processing of the nodules is

a detailed and costly undertaking.

One company intends to

refine all four of the major minerals but most are interested
in refining only nickel, cobalt and copper.

The recovery of 1

to 3 million short dry tons/year is claimed to be necessary to
turn a profit.

While operating costs vary from $18-$75/ton of

nodules, and the sale of the final products are estimated at
$65-$75 per ton, yielding
per ton before taxes.

~rofits

varying from nil to $47-$57

Since the range of operating costs varies

so drastically, it can only be assumed that certainties in these
estimates are not enjoyed by the mining enterprises.
A second major economic impact is the influence that forces
outside of the industry have on their profitability.

30

These

/

forces will have a direct impact on the future of deep sea bed
mining.

Primarily, the current deterrents to the industry

are the third world nations demanding a share in the "common
heritage of mankind."

Until debate on this subject is com-

pleted in the U.N. or the U.S. decides to go its own way, the
industry is at a standstill until the decisions are made to:
establish the economic rent which must be paid to international
authorities, the future prices at which the nodules will be sold,
and how the ocean mines are restricted in competition with land
based mining.
The third major economic factor which will impact the
operation is that of financing.
C05t~

Since the immense capital

(shown in Tables 3 and 4) cannot be met by the mining

companies/consortia themselves, loans from banks must be
obtained.

Due to the many legal complications associated

with deep sea bed mining, banks are reluctant to approve the
necessary loans.

"Thomas C. Houseman, a vice-president of

Chase Manhattan Bank, in testimony before a Senate subcommittee,
made his posi tion very clear:

'In view of the demonstrated

desire of the international community to establish control over
such an activity, the present absence of political sponsorship
and security of tenure constitute an unacceptable business
risk to a financial institution.'
The inability of mining companies to obtain the necessary
loans ... effectively stops them from moving ahead ... It is
possible for the U.S. government to provide mining companies
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TABLE 3
OCEAN MINING COST

(1975) (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)

ESTI~~TES

LOW
EXPLORATION AND R&D
CAPITAL COSTS
TOTAL INVESTMENTS

75

125

HIGH
150

385

468

550

460

593

700

40

45

50

120

143

165

WORKING CAPITAL
ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS

MEDIUM

SOURCE: REBECCA L. WRIGHT, "OCEAN MINING: AN ECONOMIC EVALUATION." OCEAN MINING ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR, MAY 1976, p. 11.
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TABLE 4
ALLOCATION OF CAPITAL COSTS: $493 MILLION
(IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
MINING SECTOR
PLATFO&~

. ..

PROCESSING SECTOR

TRANSPORT SECTOR
. S4

SECTOR COSTS

. .

55

EQUIPMENT

PIPE HANDLING . . . , 21

UTILITIES

LIFT

9

SITE. .

POWER PLANT.

7

BUILDINGS

NAVIGATION .

5
96

55

. · · ·
· · ·

. . · · ·

WASTE DISPOSAL.

TOTAL CAPITAL COSTS

199
84

20
20

·

19

342
493

SOURCE: J. D. NYHART, LANCE ANTRIM, ARTHUR E. CAPSTAFF, ALLISON
D. KOHLER, DOYLE LESHAW, "A COST MODEL OF DEEP OCEAN MINING
AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY ISSUES." MIT SEA GRANT REPORT,
(MITSG 78-4), MARCH 1, 1978, p. ES4.
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with investment guarantees, thereby eliminating the risk
involved to the companies and banks.

Houseman stated that,

were the companies to receive investment guarantees in legislation, financial support from the banks ~ould be forthcoming."l
Most recently, the Reagan administration appears to be bent
on pushing deep sea bed mining through the U.N. in a way which
is fair and equitable to those companies that have invested so
heavily thus far.

As the political turmoil is what it is, this

study is necessarily limited to the impact of deep sea bed ffilnlng
given no unforeseen depletions of currently planned revenues.

lJack N. Barkenbus, Deep Sea Bed Resources~ Politics and
Technology.
(New York: The Free Press, 1979), p. 22.
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"

CAPABILITY

Manganese nodules provide the opportunity of reducing
foreign imports drastically given the proper political and
economic framework.

The total possible .i mp a c t has to be

measured in several different areas:

(1) ocean resources;

(2) available concentrations; and (3) annual harvest per mine
site.
To consider the available resources we must consider that
mining companies have defined acceptable nodules as those
containing at least 1.24% nickel, 1.03% copper, 0.24% cobalt
and 24% manganese.

With this in mind, it is currently esti-

mated that the world's oceans contain 2100 million tons of
manganese nodules.

As shown in Table 5, the processed amount

of minerals equate to an estimated 88% of the world demand
for nickel, 7% of the world demand for copper, 367% of world
demand for cobalt and 127% of world demand for manganese.
The existing concentrations of nodules available for
mining operations vary with each company's surveyors.

The

various estimates represent a low of 4 available sites to a
high of 185.

The large variation is due to the varied def-

initions of "sure" sites and "possible" sites.
Based on previous determined economic models, a single
mining operation is expected to harvest 3 million tons annually.
This would result in a yield of 42,000 tons of nickel, 37,000
tons of copper, 4,000 tons of cobalt and 750,000 tons of
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TABLE 5
POTENTIAL CONTRIBUTION OF OCEAN RESOURCES
TOTAL SEA BED
RESOURCES
(MILLIONS OF TONS)
NODULES

RATIO OF RESOURCES TO
CUMULATIVE WORLD DEMAND
1976-2000 ·
LOW
MED
HIGH

2100

NICKEL

26.0

1. 00

0.88

0.82

COPPER

22.5

0.08

0.07

0.06

COBALT

5.0

4.39

3.67

3.28

504.0

1.34

1.27

1.10

MANGANESE

SOURCE: JUDITH KILDOW, ED., DEEPSEA MINING.
LONDON: MIT PRESS, 1980), p. 101.
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manganese per year.
5% of

~orld

Based on 1975 levels, this equates to

production of nickel, 0.5-1% of copper, 12% of

cobalt and 7% of manganese.
Given then, that production capabilities are both available
and significant, we can see that the projected levels of imports
in 1985 can be reduced.

As shown in Table 6, the U.S. can

theoretically satisfy 100% of its projected 1985 import levels
in nickel; cobalt and manganese and 18% of its copper imports
by employing 5 deep sea mining vessels.

This would be a sig-

nificant step forward in our battle to gain self sufficiency
in minerals.

37

,

....

I

".

TABLE 6 COMPARISON OF EXPECTED LEVEL OF IMPORTS (1985) l\ITH POSSIBLE
PRODUCTION LEVEL OF 5 DEEP SEA MINING SITES.
IMPORT
REQUIREMENTS (1985)

5 MINE
SITES

NICKEL

432,200,000 LBS

420,000,000 LBS

97

COBALT

20,000,000 LBS

40,000,000 LBS

200

% OF

IMPORTS

MANGANESE

1,770,000 TONS

' 3 , 750 , 000 TONS

211

COPPER

1,000,000 TONS

185,000 TONS

18
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PART IV
NATIONAL SECURITY
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CHAPTER 1:

~~TERIALS

VULNERABILITY

In . the 1973-74 time frame, conflicts in the Middle East
prompted the initial oil embargo imposed by OPEC.

This resulted

in skyrocketing prices in the petroleum industry.

This was the

initial tremor of the third world's drive for a new world
economic order.

Shortly thereafter, the International Bauxite

Association was formed and bauxite taxes were raised from
$1.80/tonto $lS/ton resulting in a. doubling of the price of
delivered bauxite.

Following these leads, mineral producer

associations were formed in copper, tungsten, mercury and iron
ore, and less developed countries began. urging changes in the
marketing structure of metals.
As a result of these activities, there has been an increased
interest in the efforts put forth by the U.s. government to
counter these moves and provide safeguards which will minimize
the effect of future unified actions by significant mineral
producers in the third world.

Proposed solutions have varied

from increasing efforts in mineral production technology, revising stockpile philosophies, to improving mineral management.
The U.S. is dependent on imports for many of its industrially used minerals.

A representative sample of various imports

are shown in Figure 3.

An unscheduled cutoff of minerals could

seriously damage our ability to produce affected goods and require the use of substitutes to produce lower quality goods
(where that option would be found acceptable).
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If additional

,

J
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d.ep os i, ts of a desired mineral could be found, mining operations,
once initiated, could be expected to commence in a short estimate of five years, but normally ten years.
A more effective use of unilateral action lVould result in
a joint cartel action (increasing prices and reducing output)
similar to the OPEC strategy.

In addition to achieving a

greater monetary return and conservation of limited resources,
a clever manipulator can also control the amount of a specific
mineral used by a consumer in need of a non-substitutable resource.

This in effect would result in exterior control of a

nation's industrial capabilities (at least in those areas
requiring that specific mineral) .
As previously discussed, manganese nodule metals represent
four of the nine critical minerals which we are most dependent
upon outside sources for supply at this time or in the foreseeable
future.

While we import all of our manganese, 53% of the world's

reserves are in Southern Africa, and 82% is held by two countries,
the USSR and South Africa, neither of which can be counted on for
a continuous supply in the future.

We also import all of our

cobalt and 52% of the world's cobalt is produced in Southern
Africa, primarily Zaire and Zambia.

While sources for nickel

and copper are less critical, we still import 74% and 18%
(respectively) of these minerals.

Although their current

sources are reliable, we expect to double our consumption by
tIle year 2000 and the projected sources of these minerals are
South Pacific islands, Austr alia and Southern Africa.
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FIGURE 3
NET IMPORT OF SELECTED MINERALS AND METALS
(% CONSUMPTION, 1979)
~IINERALS

MAJOR SOURCES

&

~IETALS

a

25

50

75

100

COLUMBIUM

.r

BRAZIL, THAILAND, CANADA

MICA(SHEET)

Ir--.--------\

INDIA, BRAZIL, MALAGASY

STRONTIUM

I~--------~l

MEXICO, SPAIN

MANGANESE

I~--------------~l

BRAZIL, GABON, S. AFRICA

TANTALUM

I

THAILAND, CANADA, MALAYSIA

COBALT

ZAIRE, BELGIUM-LUXEMBOURG~
ZAMBIA., FINLAND

1
PLATINUM
(GROUP METALS)

S. AFRICA, U.S.S.R., U.K.

BAUXITE
ALUMINA

&

JAMAICA, AUSTRALIA, SURINAM,
GUINEA

CHROMIUM

S. AFRICA, U.S.S.R., TURKEY,
ZIMBABWE (RHODESIA)

ASBESTOS

I

CANADA, S. AFRICA

TDJ

\_ _ _ _to

MALAYSIA, THAILAND,
.INDONESIA

FLUORINE

1

MEXICO, SPAIN, ITALY, S. AFRICA

NICKEL

~-------i~

CANADA, NORWAY, NEW CALEDONIA,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

BOLIVIA~

POTASSIUM

CANADA, ISRAEL

GOLD

CANADA, SWITZERLAND,

ZINC

CANADA, MEXICO, HONDURAS

U.S.S.~.

-,

MINERALS
METALS

&

MAJOR SOURCES

a

25

50

100

75

TUNGSTEN

CANADA, BOLIVIA, KOREA

CADMIUM

CANADA, AUSTRALIA, BELGIUMLUXEMBOURG

IRON ORE

Cfu~ADA,

VENEZUELA, BRAZIL

LIBERIA

SOURCE: CLARENCE A. ROBINSON, "DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD URGES MULTIYEAR CONTACTS," AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, (DECEMBER
1, 1980), p. 133.
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As our need for future sources of these minerals becomes
more obvious, we seem to be inexorably drawn to the southern
countries of Africa.

As

sho ~n

in Figure 4, it is easy to see

that the vast material resources of the area are immense.

Their

reliability as a future supplier is not totally dependable.
Frequent coups and revolutions can easily change national
policies and several countries in the area have already aligned
themselves . with communist countries.
The four minerals being considered by this study are
inextrically tied to national security.

The Department of

Defense depends on the industrial manufacture of arms and
munitions.

Whether used as repair parts or replacements/ad-

ditions to existing forces, the production of defense related
hardware is necessary to maintain current force levels and an
increased output will be required during times of conflict.
Manganese, used in the purification of iron and steel, is an
essential element in this manufacturing process.

Cobalt (as

shown in Figure 5) used in high strength/high temperature alloys
is an essential element in the manufacture of jet engine parts.
Copper and nickel are jointly used in the manufacture of piping
and conductors and are both used widely in the civilian community as well as the military.
minerals into the

u.s.

If the flow of these four

could be adequately controlled, the

security of the country could be severely threatened.
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ECO?'-IOMIC STOCKPILING

In an effort to protect our country from a shortage of
minerals during wartime, Congress (in 1946) provided for the
stockpiling of strategic minerals which would ensure a supply
adequate to provide an efficient transition to the i\artime
production levels of our industries.

This is based on the

estimated needs of the military to support an armed conflict
of a conventional scale for a specified period of time varying
from 1 to 3 years.
Recently the administration has directed that studies are
to be undertaken to determine the need for economic stockpiles.
These are proposed as a hedge against unified or cartel action
in the various areas of mineral production.

The idea is based

on the assumption that, given enough reserve supplies on hand,
the miheral users could survive longer (with the same production levels) than the cartel could afford to hold back production.

This idea has many supporters and opponents.

Those opposing the idea point out that the only sure ivay
to avoid devastating cartel actions is to locate other avialable
resources, chiefly in the unsurveyed reaches of the United States.
If this is an unfruitful attempt then other more reliable sources
must be found and developed.

The proponents of the stockpile

point out that the tapping of a new source is an extremely long
le ad time operation and that at least the stockpile could be
built up over a shorter period and provide a much closer resource.
47

The concept of maintaining economic stockpiles seems to be
a good idea in theory.

The use of economic stoc kpiles could

turn the world into a chess board with minerals as the pieces
in the strategic positioning of the ever shrinking reserves of
non-fuel minerals.
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DEEP SEA BED MINING:

ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE

While stockpiles are an obvious defense against cartelization or embargoes, they tend to offer many vulnerabilities.
Should economic stockpiles be drawn on whenever there is a
shortage in supplies or rise in prices?
do we start drawing on them?

If so, at what point

Once they have been reduced, are

they not then vulnerable to the supplier's actions?

Will ques-

tions of this sort generate desire for another stockpile to
protect the economic stockpile?

These are not simple questions.

Deep sea bed mining provides a partial solution to the need
for national economic stockpiles.

Although many mineral needs

are being considered for the economic stockpile, manganese
nodule mining offers an alternative to costly surplus stores
of nickel, copper, cobalt and manganese.
The mere concept of developing machinery capable of retrieving
these nodules has reduced the threat of market price increases.
A great deal of the success of these ventures is based on a
minimum price for the final product.

If a cartel was to in-

crease prices, the economic feasibility of each deep sea mining
site would increase, thus increasing the competition of production.

As previously seen, the capability of deep sea production

to provide these safeguards is significant due to its potential
to supply a high percentage of u.S. consumption in nickel, cobalt
and manganese.

Due to the lower percentage supplied of copper,

the protection against price hikes is not as significant.
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SU?-.fMARY
The U.S. enjoys the luxury of being more self sufficient
ln mineral resources than most other highly developed, highly
industrialized countries.

We are however becoming increasingly

dependent on foreign suppliers for critital materials needed by
industry to satisfy our military requirements.
Although these difficulties are not foreseen as the source
of armed conflict in the future, it must be assumed that restric.tions in minerals supplies may at the minimum produce considerable
international frictions.

Any means available to reduce our de-

pendence on critical materials must be carefully considered in
an effort to curtail the effects of reduction in these critical
supplies.
A very real option is, unquestionably, the exploitation of
manganese nodule resources.

This choice offers protections

against price increases, embargoes and cartel action \\hich may
be initiated in nickel, cobalt, copper and manganese markets.
The economic feasibility of this venture grows as minerals
become scarce or prices start to rise.

It offers a protection

to industry, the military and enhances national security.

The

benefits are many and need to be carefully reviewed by policy
makers.
While we are anticipating the outcome of the current Law
of the Sea negotiations, we must bear in mind that there are
many topics to be discussed and agreed upon.
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Ocean mining is

only one facet of these negotiations.
and

se~urity

Regardless of the economic

benefits, they must be considered in light of the

other available benefits which are being negotiated for in this
convention.

Too little flexibility in anyone area can compro-

mise desired outcomes in. others.

We must strive for the most

advantageous position in all facets of UNCLOS realizing that
reorientation of policy may be required to arrive at the best
possible results.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The lands and waters of the coastal zone have either
been mismanaged or not managed at all since the early settling of the United states.

Though initial settlements

were formed on coastal sites, the early settlers found that
these sites were especially subject to natural hazards
and they soon abandoned them for more hospitable, inland
areas.

The coastal shorelands and islands were not exten-

sively resettled until the late nineteenth century.

Then,

since the turn of the century, the trend from coastal
development toward inland was reversed and the coastal
zone is now experiencing population pressures which threaten the future viability of many sections. 1

Nowhere is

this more evident, perhaps, than along the nation's barrier beaches.

Rhode Island, while not suffering nearly

from the degree of development on its barrier beaches
as other states, is no exception.

Ec on omi c pressures

brought to bear have forced federal, state, and local
governments to grapple extensively with this issue.
On October 21, 1981, then Secretary of the Interior
James Watt, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on
Environmental Pollution, issued a statement as to the
importance of the nation's barrier beaches.
is an excerpt from that statement:
-1-

The following

"While it is extremely difficult to generalize about the natural resources of coastal
barriers and adjacent waters, there is no
question that these habitats contribute
large numbers of fish and wildlife resources, which are used and enjoyed by many.,,2
Their unique ability to serve as a buffer between storm
surges and landward habitat as well as their integral role
in an ecosystem which provides habitat and breeding areas
for an abundance of living resources which are dependent
on the area makes them a valuable resource to both the
surrounding community and ecosystem.

Although possessed

with an inherent ability to adapt to the forces of nature,
they are not nearly so flexible with the intrusion of man
and the pressures of development.
The need for the preservation of barrier beaches in
their natural state cannot be overstated and is recognized
by all levels of government.

Although each level of gov-

ernment has shown concern over the coastal zone and government regulation and intent in protecting barrier beaches is
clearly evident, the seeming lack of coordination between
the various levels of government has produced a nebulous
situation which in the past has not only failed to protect
barrier beaches in many cases but actually promoted development on these fragile resources.

However, the picture

appears brighter with the advent of recent federal legislation that seems to indicate a new willingness on the part
of the federal government to effectively limit development

-2-

in these areas by eliminating federal construction and
flood insurance subsidies.

This recent legislation has

the potential to act as the leading catalyst for an effective barrier beach management program.
This paper will examine the results of federal, state,
and local legislation and regulations on the development
of Green Hill Beach in South Kingstown, Rhode Island and,
from conclusions drawn from that case history, assess the
future of the extensive network of barrier beaches (see
figure 1)3 within the State of Rhode Island.

-3-
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Napatree Point Barrier
2.
HashauQ Ponds Barrier
~innap~ug Pond Barrier (Atiantic Beach)
3.
4. Quonochontaug Pond Barrier
5. Michel, Garden and East Ponds Barrier
6.
Ninigret Pond Barrier (East Beach portion)
7. Hinigret Pond Barrier (rharlestown Beach portion)
8.
Green Hill Pond Barrier
9. Trustom Pond Barrier
JO. Card Ponds Barrier
II. East Hatunuck and Jerusalem Barrier
12. PoInt Judith Pond Barrier
13. Narragansett Beach Barrier
14. Bonnet Shores Barrier
15. Mackerel Cove Barrier
16. Lily Pond Barr ier (Hazard's Beach)
17. Almy Pond Barr ier (Bai ley's Beach)
18. Ea~ton Pond Barrier (First Beach)
19. Nelson and Gardiner Ponds Barrier (Second Reach)
20. Third Beach Barrier
21. ~atch House Pond Barrier
22. Round Pond Barrier
23. Long Pond Barrier (Tappen's Beach)
24. Briggs Harsh Barrier
25. Ship Pond 8arrier
26. Round Meadow Pond Barrier
27. Tunlpus and Quicksand Ponds Barrier
28. Coast Guard Beach Barrier
29. Sandy Point and West Beach Barrier
30. Crescent Beach BarrIer
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CHAPTER 2
THE HTPORTANCE OF BARR IER BEACHES AND
THEIR I MP ORTANCE IN THE RHODE I SLAND COASTAL ECOSYSTEM

Barrier b eaches are narr ow strips of land mad e of
uncons olidat ed mat erial e x t e n d i n g roughly parallel to th e
gen e ral

coast al tr end and s e parated from the mainland by

a r elatively n arrow body of fr esh, brackish, or s a l t wa te r ,
or a wetland. 4

Th eir importance as part of a n d to the

surrounding ecosystem can not be overemphasized.

Al t h ough

fragile, barrier beaches s erve as the primary buffer b etw e en st orm s u r g es and th e l andward h abit at.

Th e role of

r educing the open s ea e ne r g ie s s o that the l andward e n vironment may persist is a critical e le men t in th e sci entific definition of a coastal barrier and one of the barrier s most import ant functions. 5

Barrier be ache s, wh i l e

fragil e a n d vulnerabl e to s t or m damage thems elves, a c t as
s t or m buffers.

Th ey a b s or b a n d dissipat e th e de structiv e

e ner g y of s t or m driven wave s, th ereby pr ot ecting the sal t
pond s, marsh es, and l ow-lying mainland b eyond th em. 6
Their ability to perform this function, however, i s dire c t l y ti ed to th eir fr eedom to shift a n d migrate with
currents a n d d evel op th ose f e atur e s common t o barrier
beach e s.

A complex int eraction of n atural forc e s a n d

conditi ons contr ol th e p ositi on a n d form of coast al b arriers.

Th e action of th e wind, waves, and tides on the

bar r ie r s unconsolidat ed s ediments caus es e r os ion or

-5-

accretion of the seaward margin, thus resulting in cha nge s in size, shape, and location.?
Coupled with this erosion process in the physical
determination of the barrier beach is the ever-increasing s e a level.

Measurements made in Newport sinc e 1930

s h ow that relative sea level is gradually rising in this
region at an average r ate of 0.0096 feet per year or about
one foot every century; due to a rough slope of Rhod e
Island south shore beaches of 1:30 to 12 feet above s ea
l evel, this equates to a horizontal encroachment of 50-60
feet per century.

8

Figure

~

illustrat e s the e f f e c t

of

erosion and the relative rise in sea level on Green Hi ll
Barrier Beach.

This change in sea level has increased

the threat of coastal flooding a n d contributes significantly to th e migration of barrier beaches in this region
landward.
Despite the complex interactions involving wave action, sand distribution, nearshore currents, and rises in
sea level, the barrier b e ach has shown a remarkable ability
to adapt to the dynamics of nature and retain th e i n tegrity
of its storm prot ection featur es.
However, these natural process es must r emain unint errupted in order for the barrier beach to act as a storm
buffer.

Left alone, coastal barriers adapt by changing

s h a p e and moving landward w

Th ey move up th e coastal plain

to remain above sea level - always managing to r etain the

-6-

EROSION AT GREEN HILL BEACH
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int e grity of their e co s ys te ms in spite of th e of te n t ot a l
r e arrang e ment of their par t icle c ompone n ts . 9
Al t h ou gh e x t re me l y a d a ptab le to th e dynamic s of n a t ure,
b arrier b e ach e s do n ot far e as well to th e intrus i on of
man and d evelopment.

Figure 3 illustrat e s th e defin abl e

f e atures of a well d evelo p ed bar r ier b e ach. 10

Mos t noti c e-

a b le i s the exist ence of a distinct dune r e gi on.

F or med

by the a c cu mu lat i on of sand blown of f the b e ach f ac e,
th e s e dune s a re e x t re mel y vulnerabl e to wind a n d wa v e
a c t i on .

Wi n d b orne sand a c cu mu l at e s r apidly a r ou n d se mi -

pe r meable ob je c ts , a n d thi s make s b e a chgra s s v ery e f f e c tive in building a n d s tab i li z i ng dun e s.
Island's b arrier b eache s s u pp or t

Mos t

of Rh ode

only on e dune line that,

in it s n atural s tate , i s well v e g etat e d with b e achgra s s
a n d a f ew shr u bs . 11

Th e inability o f thi s b e a chgra s s t o

d evel op or ma i n ta i n its elf i s the maj or factor in incre as e d
wi n d e r os io n and r e sults in a "blowout" - a smal l tra illike f e atur e s t re tch i ng a l ong the b e ach s i de of th e du ne .

12

Fai l u re of the be a ch gra s s to recoloniz e will r esult in a
d e epening a nd wid ening of the " blow out".

These "bl. ow-

out s" a re oft en u s ed as f o otpath s a n d a l t hough b e a chgra s s
i s a n e x t rao r d i n a r i l y h ardy a n d well a dap te d plant, it wi l l
not tolerat e tra mpling. 13
gree

The e nd r e sult i s a se ve re d e-

of e ros ion a lon g this p ortion of th e d une .
S i mi lar to th e e f fe c t s of wind e r os i on but u sually

more pronoun c ed i s wave e r os ion .

-8-

Here, wa ve ac t ion cuts a
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de eper an d wid er path than seen in a "bl ow ou t" an d r educ e s
th e l evel of the dune to t hat of th e b each.
f erre d to as a "wash out". 14

This i s r e-

Again, inability of the

b each grass to recolonize will re sult in a wors ening of th e
pr obl em a n d ultimately l e s s en or n egat e th e a b i l i ty of t h e
dun e t o pro te ct t he backsh ore are a fr om wave act i on during
a s t or m.
The a b i l i t y of th e bar r ie r bea ches to withstand th e
f orc e s of th e oc ean is det ermined by the h eight an d stability of the dune .

To build dune s a nd prot ect th em, th e

b each gras s must be pro t e cte d , a nd t h is me ans c ontr olling
c onstruction and vehicular a nd hu man traffic.

Figure 4

illustrat e s th e n e gative effe ct that construc ti on a n d
vehicular a nd human t ra f f ic has had on th e dune veget ati on on Green Hill Barrier Be ach.

RELATIONSHIP TO THE SURROUNDING ECOSYS TEM

Coas tal barriers pro vi de natural r e sources of s ign i fic ant value to s oc ie ty .

They creat e an d nurture estu-

a r i es a n d wetlands which nurture fin fi sh and shell fi s h
s to cks vit al to our nation' s commercial an d r ecreati onal
f ish i ng int ere st s. 15
The barrier beach, th e marsh, a n d the c oa stal pond
a re one ecosys tem .

The complex relation s hips within this

ecosys tem di ct at e that a change t o one of th e el ements of

-10-
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the syst em may pro duce a change throu ghout the whole s yst em. 16

Figure

q

illustrat es the geo graphic proximity in

th e Green Hill Beach a r ea of the s e el ement s.

The s a lt

mar sh an d coastal pond, unlike th e barrier beaches, a re
rich in plant a nd a n i mal life; but, s imi lar to the barrier
beaches , ex t r e me ly s ensitive to t he intrusion of man an d
An a ppare nt ly s mall ch ange in run off of

development.

fr e sh wat er t o th e pond or marsh as a r esult of incre as ed
draina ge from dev elo pment or the introduction of increa s e d
a moun ts of s e a wat er or sand r esulting fr om a poorly de veloped dune can r a di cally a f fe ct a n i mal a nd plant populations. 17

The Sal t rljarsh

Sal t mar shes a re low, fl at a re as that are re gularl y
fl ood ed by tidal proc e ss es and are found ex te ns i ve ly in
s e ver a l of Rhode I sland' s sal t p ond s.

The mixing of f r e s h

and sal t water caus ed by this tidal mix i ng pro duce s r ap id
oxyge n a n d nutruent c i r culat ion an d "cle ans e s" th e sys tem
within th e marsh, causing th e s a l t marsh to rival th e biolo gical pr oductivity of that foun d in int ensive a gr i cul t u r al a reas .

Sal t marshes hav e fr e quently bee n des cr i bed

as "food f act ori e s" f or th e a n i mals that live in c oa stal
wat er s . 18
Altho ugh biologi cally a ct i ve , sal t mars hes a l s o per f or m

-12-
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another valuable role within the barrier beach and co a stal
zone ecosystem.

Their ability to absorb large quantities

of water which would otherwise flood the mainland during
a storm can not be discounted. 19
Despite the obvious value that salt marshes play within
the state of Rhode Island, only about 4000 acres remain. 20
Like the barrier beach, the salt marsh is also on the
critical list.

Recent abuses caused by development, ex-

cavation, and filling have reduced their numbers significantly.

Coastal Ponds

Wi t h out the barrier beaches, there would be no s alt
ponds (see figure 5).

Like the salt marshes, coastal

ponds are also biologically productive areas.

A salt pond

is particularly vulnerable to man because he can so easily
alter its controlling parameters.

The parameters that

govern the characteristics of a salt pond are summarized
below:
I.

II.

III.

Characteristics of flow: Volume and variation of fresh and salt water flows into
the pond; circulation patterns; turbule n ce;
flushing time (the rate at which pond water is replaced by new fresh and salt water).
Water properties: Salinity, temperature,
transparency, nutrients, pollutants and
dissolved oxygen.
The Form of the Pond: Shape, size, a~~ topographyand character of the bottom.

-14-

It is the modification of the quality and change in mixtur e of the fr esh a n d s alt water in the pond that has the
gr e a t e s t effect on th e salt pond.

An incre ased flow o f

s eawater and the r esultant incre a se in sal i n i t y has th e
potential to d e stroy the d elicat ely b alanc ed environment
within the marsh.

Also , a n incre as ed fl ow of s e awat er wi l l

h ave th e t endency t o bring in a dd i t i ona l a mou n t s of s and
wh i ch is then d eposit ed in th e pond, thereby r educing its
s i ze over time.

In addition to the n egative e f fec t s that

d evelopment has on th e barrier b e ach es and dunes that r esuIt in the opening of n ew bre achways, the intr oduction of
r e sid ential s e ptic s ys te ms h as a l s o impact ed the e n t i re
ec os y s t e m.
The numb er of h ous es on the barriers and a rou n d
many o f Rh od e Island' s sal t p onds is incre a sing
a n d th e g reat majority o f th es e h ous es have
th eir own s eptic syst ems. No dat a a r e prese n t ly avail abl e on th e effect s u p on sal t ponds of
l e achings from s eptic syst ems, but s t u d i es made
in similar e n v i r on men t s elsewhere . • • sugg est
that incre a sing th e numb er of l e ach fi elds
aroun~2a pond will a d ve r se l y affect the e n v i r on ment.

ST ORM HISTORY OF RHO DE I SLAND' S BARRIER BEACHES

Ba r r ie r b e ach es, in th eir natural st at e, se r ve a s
t he fir st line of defens e a gainst major storms a n d hurric anes by prot ecting th e backshore a rea a ga i ns t s t or m
s u rge .

Rhode I sland h as be en thre at ened by 71 hurri c an es

s i n c e 16 35 of which 13 c aus ed s evere ti dal floodin g, 25

-15-

caused moderate flo oding, a n d 38 caus ed scares with little
or no flo oding . 2 3

Wh i le it i s difficult to a scertain the

da mag e t o local communities in most cas es, the hurrican es
of 1938 a n d 1954 provide s ome indication of th e dama g e
incurred.

By 1938, exte ns i ve d evelopment h ad t aken pla c e

on th e s outh s h ore be ach e s.

Wi t h a few i solat ed e x ce pt i ons ,

th e hurricane s we p t all s t r u c t u res of f a l l th e barrier
b e ach e s in the state.

Many of thes e a reas were a ga i n

built up when in 1954 a n ot he r hurric ane swept them cl e an
f or a se con d time. 2 4

Th e Pr ov i d e n c e Journal Compa n y pub-

lished in " Hurricane Car ol Lashe s Rh od e Island ll th e f ollowing statistics: 2 5

Date of Hu r r i can e

P ro p e r t y Da mage

Deaths

1938

.': 10 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0

3 17

1954

~;2 00,000,000

19

In a re port to Con gr e ss the Secretary of the Ar my on
Apr i l

15, 1977 s tat e d that the occurenc e a t that tim e of

a s t or m e qu i v a le n t to that of the 1938 or

1954 hurric a n e s

wou l d r e sult in loss es of ab out $ 10 4- 108 milli on.
por t

Th e r e-

speaks of pr ojects under c onstructi on t o r e duc e t h e

pote n t ial flood d amage t o the ar ea a n d c onclud e s that t h e
Se c re tar y of th e Ar my d oe s not r eco mmend a n d f u r t her f ede ral e xpans i on of fund s f or fl o od pr otec t i on in the a rea .
He s ugg es t s inst e ad that a numb er of local me a sure s b e

-16-

adopt ed to r educ e possibl e losses from flooding.

Inclu-

ded among these local measur es are hurricane warning and
e me r ge n cy flood mobilization measure s, flood plain zoning
r egulations, and flood proofing during construction. 2 6
Man - ma de methods de sign ed to r educ e t h e effect s of
s t or m damage have pr oven to be e c on omi cal l y impractical.
In th e long run, l and us e control a nd coastal zone mana gement a re much more effe ctive.

I mproper u s e of fl ood prone

l ands s u ch a s barrier b ea che s , a s proven by th e 1938 a n d
1954 hurricanes, only r e sults in unnec es s ary loss es of
human life, property, and se ve re s oc ial dis r upt i on . 27

-17-

CHAPTER 3
DEVELOP ~ffiNT

ON RHODE ISLAND'S

BARRIER BEACHES

The barrier beach ecosystem is remarkably adaptable
to the vagaries of nature but extremely sensitive to t h e
intrusion of man and development.

Th e dune which is so

imp ortant to the barrier beach and which gives it th e a bility to withstand storm surg e and buffer the backshore
from this storm activity has been a f avorit e spot of d e v e l ope r s for th e location of residential dwellings du e to
the improved vi e w that the dune affords.
Before World Wa r

II, approximately 90% of coast al

barrier real estate was undevel oped and l argely inac c e ssi.ble to the public.

In the year s immediately follo wing

the war, th e rat e of s e c on d home development on coast al
b arriers esc alated in response to increasing afflu ence,
mobility, and available leisur e time.

The tr end wa s e s -

pecially rapid in the Northeast where nu merous coastal
barri ers lie within a f ew hours drive of maj or population c enters.

28

In an e f f or t to reduce the impact of his d evel opment,
man h as further compounded th e problem with construction
of " stabiliz ation proj ects" such as jetties, groins, a n d
breakwaters; thereby further alt ering the natural course
of e v e n t s .

Th e respons e of thi s stressed e n v i r on men t will

v a r y in proportion to its capacity for absorbing this s t re ss .

-18-

The barrier consists of at least five distinct but integrated environments including the beach, dune field, back
dune flat, marsh, and barrier pond.

Each of these varies

in the amount of natural stress to which it is exposed and
in the amount of additional human stress which it can
sustain. 2 9
Despite present knowledge and past experience, the
attractiveness of barrier beaches has tempted many people
to ignore the- dangers associated with living on them and,
in some cases, these people do not realize the hazards
involved.
Rhode Island's barrier beaches have been subject to
increasing developmental pressures.

Increasing numbers of

commercial, recreational, and residential structures are
being built, many on the dune.

A developmental pattern

common before the state's low lying beaches were swept
clean by the 1938 and 1954 hurricanes is once again establishing itself. 3D Reasons for this resurgence in development included the lack of a coordinated federal and
state effort to regulate development, insufficient zoning
regulation at the local level, and the tenacity displayed
by the public in their willingness to assume the risks of
living on the barrier beach.

FEDERAL ENCOURA GE MENT OF BARRIER BEACH DEVELOPMENT

Over the past two decades, much of the development

-19-

on coastal b arriers has b een underwritten by the Ame r ican
t axpay er. 3 1

Not only h a s th e f ederal g ove r n men t , through

improved road s ys te ms increas ed acc e s sibility to the s e a r eas ,
but they h ave a ls o provided fed eral s u b s i d ie s f or constru cti on of bridg es a nd utilitie s on th e b a r r ie r be aches with
ado pt i on of the Na t ional Flo od Insuranc e Progr am a n d h ave
subsidiz ed to a l arg e d e gr e e th e c onstru ction of privat e
dwe l l i n g s .
Fe d e ral ass istance , dir e c t a nd indir e ct,
c omes in many forms. Direct ex p e n d i t u res
include grant s f or highw ay a n d bridg e c ons t r u c t io n , ass is t a nce in pr oviding wat er
s u p p l y a n d sewer s ys te ms , a n d pr oj e c t s t o
Ind irec t as s tab i l i ze coa s t al bar r ie r s .
sistanc e includes f e deral flood insurance
or l oan guarantees f or h ome c onstructi on. 32
The liabiliti es of the f e d eral g ove r n me n t
i s s ign i f ic a n t .

in c oa stal b a r r i e r s

Not including fl o od insuranc e, th e f ed e r al

go v e r n men t h a s spent at l east $8 0 0 milli on s i n ce fi s cal
y e ar 1975 to ass i s t pr ivat e c ons t r uct i on on c oa stal
ri ers.

b a~-

In ad diti on, th e Fe de ral Eme rg e ncy Ma n age men t Ag e n cy

est i mates tha t t he f ed eral go ver n men t

i s potentially lia-

bl e f or $ 10 - 15 billion in fl oo d insuranc e covera g e along
t h e At lan t ic Oc e a n a nd Gu l f of Me x i co - one of th e lar g e st
liabili ti e s aga i ns t th e F e d e ral tr e a sury.33

These c os t

es t ima te s discount t h e intangible cost s s uc h as hu ma n liv e s.
Th e effec ts of this f ederal promotion of de ve l op m n t
h as b e e n s e en directly al ong th e c oa st of Rh ode I sland. A
s tudy publis h ed in th e Nove mbe r , 1977 i s su e of Hou s ing a n d
Dev e lopme n t Re p or te r support s t he s tan d that th e National

-20-

Flo od Insurance Pr ogr a m tend s t o en c ou rage c onstru cti on
on barrier beache s.

Spo nso re d by th e Department of Hou-

sing a nd Urban Develo pment, the au t h or claims that Rh ode
I sland has been most a f fe ct e d by th e pr ogr a m. 34

The study

f ound that "Rhode Island lending institutions which previously had r efused to lend money for mortgage s i n h i gh
haz ard are as now t ake mortgages s e cure d by flood insur anc e
on c e e x cl u ded " . 3 5

S ou t h Ki ngs t own began its pa r t i c i pa t i on

in th e Na t i ona l Flood Insurance Pro gram in 197 2 and it was
th en that re que sts fo r building permits wer e submitt e d t o
th e t own building inspector, in spite of th e f act tha t t he
local z oning pr ohibiti on on the barri er b eache s had be en
dropped in 1966.

-21-

CHAP~~ BR

4

EFFE CTS OF FEDERAL , STATE, AND LOCAL REGULAT I ON ON
THE DEVE LOP ME NT OF RH ODE ISLAND' S BARRIE R BEACHES

The r egulation of d evelopment on the barrier b e ach e s
o f Rho d e I sland h as b e en a d d r e sse d or a f f e c t e d by l e gis l ati on or i g i n a t i n g in th e three b asic l evels of government f ederal, s t a t e , a nd local.

Al t hough ea ch level of g ov e r n -

ment has sh own c onc ern ove r th ese fr a gile co a st a l e c os y s t e ms, legislati on a t ea c h l evel was not n ec es sarily c ompl ementary and, a t times, had the effect of actually promoting d evel opment on th ose b e a ches or forcing th e l owe st
l evel of g ov e r n men t to adopt specific regul ation to pr ot ect their own interest s as th ey wer e n ot b eing a de qu a t e l y
pr ot ected by th e state or fed eral governments.
In or d e r to fully und erstand th e legal i ssu es a n d
unc ertainti es that have a r i s e n r egarding d evelopment on
Rh od e Island' s b arrier b e ach es, it is n ec essary to l oo k
at the rol e each level of government h as played on a n
individual basis.

THE FEDERAL ROLE

The United S t a t e s Con s t i t u t ion carefully h a s pres erve d
th e sover eignty of each s t a te and h a s grant ed th e f ed eral
government specific p owers.

An y l e gislation which is

ad opted on the f ederal l evel must b e within the scope of

-22-

that s pe c i f ie d

p owe r ~

On l y t ho se power s whi ch a re n e ces-

s a r y to r e gulat e a ct i v i t ies wh i ch a f fe ct many s tat e s a nd
t heir int era ct i on s c ome wi t h i n th e sc op e of th e f ederal
go ve r n me n t . 3 6
Th e basis f or t he Fe deral government's rol e and th e
e s t ab l i s h men t of fed eral pro grams i n t he c oast al zo ne i s
bas ed on th e co ns t i t ut ional l y granted au t ho r i t y give n t he
Congr e s s to r egulat e co mme rce .

In Gi bb ons v. Ogden , J ust-

i ce Mars hal l int erpr et ed c omme r ce to equa l trans p ortati on
whi ch in turn

equ~ls

navigation.

"All navigable wate rs ar e under t he c ontr ol
of the Uni t e d St a t es f or t he pur po s e of
r egulating a nd impr ov ing navigation.,,37

The Coa s ta l Zone Ma nag e me nt Act of 197 2 (P.L. 92- 583 , 8 6
St a t 1280)

Wi t h pass a ge of th e Coa s t a l Zone Ma na ge men t Act i n
197 2 and th e s ubseque n t a me nd me nts of 1976 a n d 1980, t he
f ederal go ve r nme nt ha s t aken the l e ad in es tabl is h i ng a
nati onal s e t of pr i or i t ies for t he manag ement of th e n a tion' s c oastal zone.

Altho ugh originally des igned a s par t

of a national l and us e planning program, th e Coasta l Zone
Ma na ge men t Act ( CZIVlA) i s esse n t ial l y the onlt e lemen t of
that pr ogr a m to c ome to

fruit~on.

Pa s se d with e s s ent i ally

unanimous support, CZ lVlA was en es se nt ial s t e p f orwar d in
sol v i ng t he proble ms of th e incre a sin g c ompetition f or a
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limit ed r e s our c e and th e l ack of a ny l evel of g ov ernm en t
a t te mpt i ng t o int e grat e nati onal pr io r i t ies with th e ne e ds
of s tate a nd l oc al g ove r nments .

CZ~~

wa s pas sed by Congr s s

in an e f f or t t o en co urage s tates in th e d eve l opment a n d
i mpl ementation of their own coas ta l manage me nt progr a ms .
Pr i or to

CZ ~~ ,

l e gisla ti on d id exis t on the s tat e

l evel t o a t te mpt t o mana g e c oa stal i s sues.

Ge ne ral ly ,

h owever, that l e gisla ti on was l ar gely a r esult of cr is i s
manage me nt t o Ilintr oduc e d t hre ats ll r ath er than pa r-t of a
compre he ns i v e s tatew ide ma nage ment effo r t .
el i g i bl e f or f unding,

cz r~

To become

ou t l i n es ce r ta i n r equirement s

f or th e individual s tat e pr ograms. 38
I.

I I.
III.
I V.

v.

VI.

CZfVlA r equire s id entifi cati on of th e coas tal
z one. Landwar-d b oundarie s must be bas e d
on s ho re l i ne c on t ro ls whi ch have d i re ct
impa ct on c oastal wat ers.
CZIVUi. requires that the pr ogram de f i ne
pe r missable us e s of th e coas t a l z on e.

CZl"JA r e quir e s that t he pro gram list a l l
a reas of parti cular c on cern.
UZIV1A requir es that t he program e s tabl is h
pr io r i t ies of us e s in the coas tal z on e.
One of th e most import ant r equir e ments of
CZf1A i s t he i dentifi cati on of t he means by
wh i ch t h e s tat e prop oses t o exe r t c ontr ol
ove r l and an d water u s e s.
CZr:~ r equires t hat c onsiderati on be g i ven
in t he program t o na ti onal int erests.

CZMA is a volunt ary l aw a nd doe s n ot r equir e s tate s
t o de ve lop mana gement programs .

I n a n e f fo r t t o en c our -

age t h eir par t i c ipa t ion in a nation al c oa stal mana gement
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pr ogram , tw o ke y e l e me n t s we r e include d in th e or ig i nal
l e gis l ation.

Fe de ral fun ding in t h e fo r m of categor i cal

gr a n t s were a va i lab le to tho s e st at es which h a d devel o ped
mana g ement p l a ns a n d had th e m a p pro v ed by th e Of f i c e of
Coas t a l

Zon e Manage men t with in th e Nat ional Ocean i c a n d

At mos phe r ic Ad mi n i s t r a t i on of th e Depar t men t

of Comme r c e .

In a d d i t i on , a con s is t e n cy provisi on that r equired th e
f e d eral gove r n me n t ab ide by th e indivi dual stat e mana g ernent programs a fte r a p pro val of th e plan gran te d the s t at es
s o me contr ol over th e f ederal rol e in their l o cal a reas .
Th is n ew a p proach pr ovide d c oa stal stat es with unpr e c ed ent e d influenc e ove r some f ederal a c t ions . 3 9
The Coas tal

Zone Manageme n t

Impro ve ment Ac t of 198 0

substantially a mende d th e original statut e and pr ov i d ed
f or th e expansi on of nati onal ob je c t i ves in co a stal z on e
pr ot e cti on.

Par t i cu lar ly s igni f ican t t o th e manag e men t

of the n a ti on' s barrier beaches , chang e s t o sec t ion 30 3
of czrl!A " e s t abLf.s h e d an e x p l i c i t n ati onal o oa.s t.a'L pro t e cti on policy e n c ou r a g i n g s tates , working with t h e f e de r a l a nd l o cal go ve r nme n ts a nd th e publi c, t o deve l op
manageme n t pr ogra ms that a dd ress n e w nati onal coas ta l
p ol i c ie s " . Inclu de d a mong thi s n ew directi on t o th e stat es
wa s th e followin g ob je c t i ve : 40
Manage coas ta l de ve l opme n t t o minimi z e l os s
of life a nd pr operty caus ed by impr op er de v el opment i n fl o od pro ne , s to rm s u rge , ge ol ogi c al h a z ard, a nd e ros i on pr one a r eas , or
in a r eas of s ub s iden ce a n d sal t wat er
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intrusi on, a nd by dest ruc t ion of n a tural
pro t e c t i ve f e atur e s s u ch as beaches , dun es,
we t l a n d s , and b arri er i sl and s.

The Nat ional Fl o od I ns u ran ce Pro g ra m a n d Floo d Dis ast er
Pr otec t ion Act of 1973

The Na t i onal Fl o od Insuran c e Pr ogr a m a n d Fl ood Di s as t er F r ot e c t i on Ac t h a s b e en adm i n i s te re d by the Depa r t me nt of Hous i ng a n d Ur ban Deve l opmen t 's Fe de ral
Ad mi n i s t r a t or s i nc e 19 68 .

Insura n c e

The Pr og r a m a l lows pro pe r t y

own e r s in f l oo d pr one munici paliti e s which h ave institut e d
f loo d contr ol meas u res to pur chas e f lood insuran c e f r om
p r i v a t e age n ts a t r at e s s u bs i d i zed 90% by t h e pr ogram. 4 1
De signe d t o gu ide de ve lop men t awa y fr om fl o od pro ne a r eas ,
the pr og ra m h a s taken a way th e mark et con t ro l of t he se
a reas a n d e f f e ct i v e l y promot e d d evelo pment.
Fe d e r a l s tan dar ds a dopte d as par t

of t h e Na t i on a l

Fl o od I ns u r a n c e Progr a m con ce n t r a t e on r egulating th e d e s ign of s t r uct u res in th e s e a reas a n d r e quire t he fol l owi n g " fl o od proof i ng " me a sure s. 42
I.

II .

III.

Th ey r equir e that th e l owe st floor of
r e sidential s t r uc t u r es be e le vated to
a bove t h e 100 y e ar s t i l l wat er flo od
l evel.
The y r equire that non-r e sid ential s t ruct ures be fl o od pro ofed t o the 100 y e ar
l evel.
They requir e a dditi onal des ign f e atur e s
to minimi z e fl o od da mag e t o or move ment
of s t r u c t u res a n d wat er a n d sewe r s yste ms .
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The Na t i ona l Flood I ns u ra n c e Program h a s h a d d i ff i cu lty
in e s t a b l i s h i n g r e gulatory st andard s wh i c h a c c omodate th e
se v e re wave a c t io n and s torm surge ty pi cal of th e op en
o cean s h orel i n e .

De s ign standar d s for co a stal a rea s s u b -

j e c t t o h igh v el o city wave a c t ion ( th e V-z one on NF IP map s)
d o n ot a c cou n t for wave h eight or runu p which can a c c ou n t
fo r a n incre a s e of a s mu ch a s 50% ove r s t ill wat er fl o o d
l evel s. 43

F igu re 5 illustrat e s the e f f e c t

of wa v e r u nup

and wa ve se t up on c oast al wat er l evels during flo odin g. 44
Th is r e gulat ory e mph a s is on "fl ood pr o ofin g" new st r u ct u r es thr ough th e us e of d e sign s tan da r ds r a t h er t h an
locati on r estrictions that would prohibit de ve l opmen t

in

flood prone coa stal a r eas s uch as bar r ie r b e ache s has s e r v e d
only t o com plicat e stat e a n d l ocal e f fo r ts in c ontrolling
d evel opment in th e s e a r eas .
Wi t h Na t i on a l Fl o od Insuranc e Pr ogr a m s u bs i d ies s o
r e a d ily a v a i lable , i ns u rance com pan ie s whi ch in th e ~as t
refus e d to u nderwrit e th e high ri sks incurred with c on s t r u c t i on on b arri er bea c h es a nd ban k s whi ch h ad r e f u s e d
t o i s s u e mort g a g e s with out insuranc e pro tec t ion , n ow f ound
t hat th e mar ket c ontrol whi ch h ad wor ke d s o we l l t o r e stri c t
de ve lopmen t

in th e pas t was e f fec t i ve l y r emove d - a nd t hat

the f e d eral g ov e r n me n t wou ld pick u p t h e t ab f or thi s
r estri cti on of mark et c ontr ol.
Th e obvious r e sult of t h is pro g ram is that c ertain
f l o od pro of i ng or fl o od p re ve nt i ng me a sure s a r e r e quir e d
in n e w c ons t r u c t i on on th e fl o od p la i n . 45
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Howev e r , a n d

mor e imp ort ant:
" • • • flood insuranc e s u s ta i n s and e v e n i ncr eas e s a l r ea dy high de ma n d a n d pr operty
values in coastal are as, substantially red uce s financial ri sk of pr op erty owne rs
f r om da mag e fr om hurric ane s, and t ends to
ac t a s a count erforc e t o eff ective c oast al
fl ood plain management."46

Th e Omn i b u s Rec onciliation Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-35)

As part of th e Rea ga n Administration " Ne w Federalis mll

,

t h e Omn i bu s Re con c i l iat i on Act of 1981 wa s s ign e d into l a w
by Pre s i de n t Re agan on Augu s t
Ac t

13, 19 8 1.

Pr ovisions in th is

c all f or th e prohibition of n ew f ederal flood ins u r an c e

c overage f or n ew c on s t r u c t i on or s u b s tan t i a l

improve ment s

on s t r u c t u r e s on undeveloped b arrier beache s a f te r Oc tobe r
1983.

1,

Fl o od insurance is sued b ef ore that dat e wou l d r e ma i n

in e f f e c t r egardless of l ocation.

Th e "und evelo pe d" b arr i er

b e ache s r eferred to in the Act were identifi ed by the De partment of the Int erior a n d includ ed 188 und evelo ped c oas t al
b a r r ier units ', tot aling 747 mil es of b e ach in 16 st at e s,
that would be subj ect t o the fl ood insurance cutoff. 47
The passage of the Omn i bu s Re c on c i l iat ion Ac t

of 198 1

signalled t o lower level s of government the continuing int e ntion of the Re a g an Ad mi n i s t r a t i on to r educ e or e l im i n a t e
th os e f ederal pr ograms that tend to frustrat e cons erva ti on
ob je c t i v es .

The e l i mi n a t i on of f ederal insuran c e to b a r r i e r

b e aches {i l l s erve to r eturn th e a r eas t o ma r k et control
and s u b se que n t l y n aturally restrict th es e sensitiv e ar e a s
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to new development.

Although it can be argued that new

construction will still take place by those few individuals able to afford construction of dwellings on barrier
beaches without mortgages, the reluctance of banks to issue mortgages to the vast majority of those people requiring
mortgages will serve to severely restrict any new development in the majority of those barrier beaches designated
as undeveloped by the Department of Interior.

The Coastal Barrier Resources Act (P.L. 97-348)

Signed into law by President Reagan on October 18,
1982, the Coastal Barrier Resources Act (CBRA) is another
element of the Reagan Administration's "New Federalism"
and was enacted despite the strenuous objections of the
National Association of Realtors and the National Association of Home Builders.

CBRA establishes the Coastal Bar-

rier Resources System and prohibits the expenditure of most
new federal financial assistance within the units of that
48
system.
This legislation is directed specifically to the
nation's barrier beaches and recognizes their unique and
valuable role.

CBRA prohibits new federal funding for

federal flood insurance, bridges, roads, sewers, economic
development, home construction, and new shoreline erosion
and stabilization projects on undeveloped barrier beaches
within the Coastal Barrier Resources System.

Ex c e p t i on s

include expenditures for energy activities and exploration
-29-

de pend ent on c oastal wat ers, a i r an d water naviga ti on ai ds
a nd devi ces, fish a nd wildlife prot ection a nd enh a n ce men t
me asu r e s , nation a l s e curity activities, a n d dis ast er r e lie f to save human live s. 49
Se ct i on 4 of CERA e s t a bl ishe d the Coas t a l Bar r i er
Resour ce s Syst em which is referre d to by a s e t of ma ps
dat ed Apr i l 28 , 1982 (revis ed Se pt e mb er 30 , 1982) a nd fil e d
with the Commit t e e on Mer cha n t Mar i ne a nd Fi s h er ie s of t h e
Hous e of Re pr e se nt a t i v e s an d t h e Commi t t e e on Env i r on men t
a nd public \'larks of th e Sena te .

Th e s e ma ps delin e at e t h os e

a r e a s that ar e tr eated as undevel oped f or the pur pos e s of
CBRA .

A thre sh old of a pprox ima te l y on e structur e
per five acr e s of f a s t lan d was u s e d in det ermining if a c oast al barri er was devel ope d.
This thr esh old has b e en us ed in pr evi ou s
delineati ons of und evel oped c oa stal barriers
pr e par ed by th e De partment of th e Int eri or.
Ar eas that exc ee d this thresh old tend to
int erfere with natural proce s s e s of c oast a l
barri ers and, th eref ore, generally wou l d
not f all within th e definition of a n un develop ed c oa stal barrier. I t i s import ant t o
n ot e that, f or th e most par t , c oa stal barr i er s a r e either much more or much
ss de vel oped than this thr e sh old l evel. ~

r6e

Al l f ederal age nc i es that a d mi n i s t er progr ams wi th i n t h e
Coastal Ba r r i er Res our ce s Sy s t e m are affe ct e d by CBRA .

Se c-

ti on 5 of CBRA s t a tes t hat n ew f ederal ex pe n d i t ur e s a n d £ i nancial a s s i s t a n ce a re proh i b i t e d fo r a ny pur po s e .

The

imp ort anc e of this part of CBRA cann ot b e ov er s t a ted .

Tbe

patt ern of gr owth wi t h i n th e co a stal zone has be en gr e a t l y
a f f e ct ed by th e numer ous f ed eral e c on omi c , s oc i a l , a n d
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environmental programs within the zone.

As many as fif-

teen federal programs were concerned with projects (such
as installation of roads, bridges, sewers, and water supply systems) that prove to be essential for community
development and growth. 5 1
The implementation of CBRA and the subsequent prohibition of new federal expenditures will serve as the
common denominator that has been so sorely needed to ensure the viability of a national set of objectives designed
to regulate, and not promote, development on the nation's
barrier beaches.
It is important to note that Section 5 of CBRA does
not prohibit private financial transactions or banks from
issuing mortgages for homes within th e extent of the
Coastal Barrier Resources System.

The construction of

structures funded by state or local governments is also
not prohibited.

Although private and state and local

government construction is not regulated, the absence of
federal subsidies for new insurance policies or for new
construction will serv.e to return these undeveloped areas
back to a market control which has, in the past, effectively
regulated development.
Section 8 of CBRA is designed to ensure that the
CBRA will not interfere with a stat e's right to protect,
rehabilitate, preserve, and restore lands within its
established boundaries and that state and local governments are free to take additional measures, consist ent
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wi t h f e deral l aws, to c ontr ol their c oa st al r es ourc e s. 52

Till, STA TE ROLE

I n 1969, a grou p of co n ce r ne d citi z ens r eco gni ze d
t hat Rhode I sland' s 4 19 mil e coas t l ine , and Nar raganse tt
Bay in particular, wer e in danger.

No single plan or

au t ho r i t y ex is t ed t o r egulat e the us e of th e s e r e s our ces,
deve lop me nts that were r e stri cting f u t ure ch oic es wer e
pro c e e d i n g a t a n ac ce le rat i ng r at e a n d much of t h e gre at
valu e ha d already be en lo st.

The pr oble m of how c oa s t a l

r e s ourc e s s ho u l d be manage d b e came th e t opic of two year s
of int ens e l e gislative debate. 53
Pri or t o pa s s ag e of th e f e deral Coas ta l Zone Mana ge ment Act, th e Stat e of Rhode I sland, in 1971, enacted legi slati on creat i ng th e Coas tal Resour ces rJIan a ge.men t Coun ci l
( CRMC) (Titl e 46, R. I . Ge ne ral Laws , Se ct i ons 46-2 3- 1 t hr ou gh
46- 2 3-1 2 ) .

Th is se ve nt ee n me mbe r c oun c i l was dele gat e d

authority by th e s t a te l e gi slature a s th e principal mecha n ism fo r manage men t of the s ta te 's c oa s t al r e s ourc e s and
gran te d jurisdicti on ov er manage me n t of th e s t a t e ' s c oa s t a l
zone.
HAny per son, fir m, or g ov ernment al a ge nc y
pr opo sing a ny devel opment or ope rat ion
wi th i n , a bo ve , or beneath th e tidal wat er
b elow the 1'JJ.H\;J mark, ext ending out t o th e
ex te n t of th e s ta te 's jurisd i cti on in th e
t errit orial s ea s hal l be r equired to
demonstrat e that it s pro posals would not
(1 ) c on f l i ct with any r e sourc e s management
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plan or program; (2 ) make any a rea uns u i tabl e for a ny uses or activitie s to
wh i ch it is a l l oca te d by a r e s ourc es
a na g e men t plan or pr ogram ; or (3 ) significantly da mage the env i r on ment of the
c oa stal region . The Council shall be
a u thor i z e d to a ppr ov e , modify , se t c onditions for , or r e je ct any su ch pr opos al ."54
In a dd i t i on , the Coun c i l was granted authority "ov er t ho s e
land are as ( t h os e areas above th e

~ffiW

mar k ) where • • •

t h er e is a r easonable probab il ity of c on fl i ct wi t h a plan
or pr ogr a m f or resourc es management or dama ge to th e
co astal

C::'-

environment " .~?

Us es a n d a ct i v i t ie s wi t h i n t he s e

a r a s includ e :
I.
I I.

III.

IV.

v.
VI.

Power generating and desalination plant s ,
Chemi cal or petr oleum proc e s sing , transfer ,
or s tor age ,
Mi ne r a l s ex t ra ct ion ,
Sho r e l i n e pr otecti on f acilities and phys i ographic al f eatur e s ,
Inte rtidal s a lt marsh es , a n d
Sewa ge t r eatment and d Ls posaL an d solid
wa s t e disposal faci lit ies . 56

Th e ab ov e l eg islation has , in e f fe ct , given t h e 8RMC d i rect
a u t h or i t y ove r thos e activities that are likely to s i gn i fic antly a f f e ct t he sh ore or tidal wa t ers . 57
"The Coun c i l is the last st ep for in-st a t e
pe rmi t pr ocedur es a nd a ct s f ormally only
'."h en all local a n d ot he r st ate appro vals
have be en obtained . Pe rsons pr opo sing
a l te rat ions al on g th e shoreline a re info r me d by Coun c i l staff or l oc a l au t h or - 8
ities when a Cou n c i l permit is r equire d . 1I 5
It is imp ort ant t o no t e t hat the bu r d en of proof , a s
de fine d in Se ct ion 23- 6 , is not on the Stat e of Rhod e I s l and but th e perm i tte e t o a s ce r ta i n t ha t t he prop os ed
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development falls within the guidelines set up under the
Council.
Although coastal regions under CRMC jurisdiction are
subject to CRMC regulations, it is emphasized here that
the Coastal Resources Management Program (CRMP) created
by the CRMC does not regulate the following activities or
land uses:
I.

II.

The Program will not have zoning controls
or powers. These will remain the responsibility of local government.
The Program does not regulate single family
homes or control sprawl unless they have a
direct impact on coastal resources.

III.

The Program will not stop all development
on altered or developed barrier beaches.

IV.

The Program does not propose increased
public acquisition of recreation facilities ot~er than those areas proposed in
the Bay Island Park Plan.

V.

It is not a growth management program, however, the Program does direct growth away
from some key coastal resources. 59

In 1974, Rhode Island became one of the first states to
receive assistance under the Federal Coastal Zone Management Act. 60 Thus, although the Coastal Zone Management
Act provided much needed funding for the coastal zone management program within Rhode Island, the state previously
recognized the importance of its coastal resources and
set about to protect these resources through the creation
of the CRMC and adoption of the CRMP.
Three of the stated goals of the CRMC for the

-34-

management of the Rhode Island coastal region and, in
particular barrier beaches, are stated below:
I.

II.

III.

Protect and preserve valuable natural
and cultural resources such as historic
sites, barrier beaches, coastal ponds,
wetlands, and fishing grounds that are
vulnerable to development and misuse.
Protect the public from hazards brought
by floods, erosion, and the placement of
buildings and septic systems on unsuitable landforms and soils.
Establish a working partnership among
local, state, and federal governments
that insures the efficient administration of the coastal management program. 6 1

As delineated above, while the state has a natural
interest in the protection and preservation of its barrier beaches, there are no regulations specifically denying "across the board" development on barrier beaches.
Although a brief moratorium existed in 1967 on development following a major storm and a moratorium exists while
formulation of a revised CRMP is being sought, the state has
generally taken a reactive role rather than assuming the
lead in the regulation of development on its barrier
beaches.
The CRMC has found it necessary to assign all barrier
beaches to one of two categories as follows:
I.
II.

Altered or Developed Barrier Beaches
Undeveloped Barrier Beaches 62

Appendix A identifies the classification of individual
barrier beaches within the state.
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Criteria for the

designation of "developed" versus "undeveloped" barrier
beaches has been based on past development history rather
than the suitability of the individual barrier beach for
any development at all.

Again, this stance has left the

door open for further development on those beaches currently designated as "developed" whether or not they are suitable for 1) further development or,2) any development at all.

THE ROLE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

The role of local government in the regulation of
development of the barrier beaches of Rhode Island is tied
directly to the long-standing delegation of the zoning
power from the state to the local level.

The Rhode Is-

land State Legislature has authorized its municipalities
to adopt zoning regulations, building codes, and subdivision regulations and under Rhode Island Law (Chapter 54-24
General Laws) communities may restrict the use of land
subject to flooding. 63
There is also broad language glvlng municipalities the necessary powers to act for
the benefit of the community's health,
safety, and general welfare and are known
as police powers. These police powers
may be delegated to the municipalities
via enabling legislation, through the state
constitution, or state statutes granting
certain specific responsibilities.64
The ability of local governments to regulate development
through the use of its police powers (as delegated from
the state government) seems clear and well founded in
-36-

state law.

THE

~

OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN AND THE REGULATION OF DEVELOP-

MENT OF GREEN HILL BARRIER BEACH

The Town of South Kingstown has assumed a leadership
role within the State of Rhode Island with respect to
liniting development on barrier beaches and, for the purposes of this paper, will be used as an example of the
role of local government in that regulation.

BACKGROUND

After the hurricane of 1954, South Kingstown

zoned

Green Hill Beach (see figure 5) as a Flood Damage Zone
and thus prohibited construction on it. 65

Section VII-A

of the South Kingstown zoning ordinance, adopted October 22,
1956, stated:
Beach Danger - BD District Uses
In a Beach Danger (BD) district no building shall be erected or altered and no
building shall be used for any purposes
except:
I. Boat docks, fishing studes, and
small beach cabanas as conditioned
in Section X-A;
II. Non-building uses such as bathing
beaches, picnic areas, golf clubs,
auto parking spaces, parks or
wildlife refuges, together with
such small buildings for daytime
occupancy only whigg are auxiliary
to these uses • • •
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The combination of this local ordinance and the inavailability of flood insurance for structures on barrier
beaches effectively worked together to allow Green Hill
Beach to remain undeveloped.
In 1966, with adoption of a new zoning ordinance,
South Kingstown dropped the Beach Danger portion of their
zoning ordinance.
Reasons for this deletion are difficult
to reconstruct, however, it had been 12
years since the last hurricane and the
conditions which it had produced were no
longer fresh in anyone's mind. Moreover,
it was generally felt that the newly revised state health regulations regarding
the placement of on-site sewage disposal
mechanisms would ser
to limit development on the beaches. 7

6e

It was not, however, until 1972, when South Kingstown began its participation in the National Flood Insurance Program that construction on Green Hill Beach skyrocketed.

Prior to 1972, a total of 4 building permits

were issued for dwellings on the beach.

In 1972 alone,

30 permits were issued by the building inspector in South
Kingstown.

Table 1 further illustrates the effects of

the National Flood Insurance Program and provides data
on the subdivided lots on the barrier beaches of South
Kingstown.
The combination of a lack of a local zoning ordinance
and the willingness of banks to issue mortgages concurrent
with South Kingstown's participation in the National Flood

-38-

TABLE 1

DEVELOPMENT ON THE BARRIER BEACHES OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN

TOTAL SUBDIVIDED LOTS -

170

* TOTAL UNDEVELOPED LOTS - 126
*

TOTAL DEVELOPED LOTS -

30

*NUMBERS DO NOT EQUAL TOTAL BECAUSE SEVERAL OF THE DEVELOPED
LOTS ARE OVERSIZED

DEVELOPED LOTS
BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED PRIOR TO 1972 - 4
** BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED 1972 - 30

BUILDING PERMITS ISSUED POST 1972 - 3
**7 Of THESE WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CANCELLED IN 1973 FOR REASONS
UNKNOWN

STATE RESIDENT OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED LOTS - 3/30 (10%)
OUT OF STATE OWNERSHIP OF DEVELOPED LOTS - 23/30 (77%)
UNKNOWN (OWNER'S RESIDENCE NOT AVAILABLE - 4/30 (13%)
IN TAX ASSESSOR'S OFFICE)

BEACHSIDE LOTS (DEVELOPED) - 14
BACKSIDE OF DUNE LOTS (DEVELOPED) - 16
TABLE 1
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Insurance Program spurred development on Green Hill Beach
to a level it had never before experienced.

The lessons

of the 1938 and 1954 hurricanes, which had leveled every
existing structure on the beach at the time, were clearly
forgotten.
It was about at this time that a new awareness of
coastal zone management precipitated the idea of renewed
flood danger zoning ordinances within South Kingstown.
Events that spurred this interest included the following:
I.

In June of 1973, South Kingstown voters
approved a referendum adopting a new
Zoning Enabling Act. This new enabling
legislation gave the Town of South Kingstown statutory authorization to adopt
regulations for designated areas, and
controlling and limiting development in
such areas subject to periodic or seasonal flooding.

II.

The Army Corps of Engineers supplied a
set of flood maps as part of South
Kingstown's participation in the National
Flood Insurance Program. These maps
enabled the Town to delineate accurately
the areas subject to flooding so that
development in such areas could be regulated.

III.

Several barrier beach reports were published providing necessary supporting
data for zoning beaches as Flood Danger
Zones. The most important among these
was the Olsen and Grant report on Rhode
Island's Barrier Beaches: Volumes 1 and
(cited earlier).

£
IV.

The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council, which was created in
1971, was in the process of adopting a
Management Plan impelling statewide concern and aw~reness in coastal zone
management. b8
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A new amendment to the Zoning Ordinance of South Kingstown, authorized by the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act,
gave the town authority to zone flood hazard areas as well
as the right to protect areas of ecological significance.
This amendment was adopted May 29, 1975 and delineated a
High Flood Danger (HFD) Zone as follows:
"Section A, Article I, Section 2, Zones and
Zoning Maps is hereby amended by adding the
following:
There shall be a High Flood Danger Zoning
District, designated as an HFD Zone."b9
With the adoption of a revised zoning ordinance in
1976, the Town of South Kingstown prohibited any use within the HFD Zone which would involve 24 hour per day human
habitation in this area.

Uses permitted within the zone

as a result of this zoning ordinance are listed in Appendix B.70

SUMMARY

The federal government, through the power granted it
to regulate commerce, has instituted a comprehensive coastal
management program attempting to integrate national priorities with state and local needs.

The Rhode Island state

government (both before and after passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act) has displayed an active interest in
its coastal resources through the creation and subsequent
operation of the CRMC.

However, the local government,
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in this case South Kingstown, did not feel that its barrier
beaches were being adequately protected and were forced to
adopt zoning regulations to protect those beaches.
In a letter to the Chairman of the CRMC on February 5,
1975, the President of the South Kingstown town council
stated:
"The town council of the Town of South
Kingstown has had the opportunity to review the CRMC proposed revisions to its
barrier beach policy and regulations. We
feel the proposed revisions would have many
undesirable effects upon the barrier beaches within the Town of South Kingstown.
Specifically, the revisions propose that
two of the three barrier beaches in the
town be classified as "developed" barrier beaches, presumably where development (including residences) may be permitted. ,,71

Mr. Gray's letter went on to say that a recent South Kingstown Planning Department Study showed that on the 99.3
acres of Green Hill Beach there were only 30 residences;
the beach had a development capacity of 233 houses based
on then existing platted lots - therefore the beach was
only 13 percent developed with the remaining land being
oped sand dunes and bordering on a salt pond. 72 The
issuance of the 1976 CRMP included Green Hill Beach as
a "developed" beach, while the other barrier beaches in
South Kingstown (Moonstone and Browning) were classified
as "undeveloped".
Again in 1977 the Town of South Kingstown offered
comments to the CRMP dated summer 1977.
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South Kingstown

found its organization, content, and the process through
which it was developed to be in the best interest of the
coastal resources of the State of Rhode Island.

The Town

of South Kingstown did however, offer the following comments during the public hearing for the Council's consideration. 7 3
"Much of the coastal zone is not suitable
for development due to the areas susceptibility to storms and erosion. South Kingstown therefore, has developed a management
plan using strong zoning measures to restrict
development along its coastline. The plan is
designed to protect those areas where a significant degree of storm damage is likely or
those where residential development would increase the rate of erosion. The first zoning
measure was the adoption of a Flood Danger
District, also known as the High Flood Danger Zone. A second zoning measure was adoption of the regulation in the Zoning Ordinance
requiring a 150-foot setback from an on-site
waste disposal mechanism to an intertidal salt
marsh or mean high water line of a tidal water
body."
The Town of South Kingstown felt the proposed CRMP did not
support the above mentioned effort of the town.

Green Hill

Beach has been designated as "developed" and therefore,
residential development is not prohibited on it categorically.

South Kingstown felt it was in its own best in-

terests to not allow further development on Green Hill
Beach.

However, the Council has left the possibility

open and thereby has put the local ordinance in a questionable situation. 7 4
It is interesting to note that, in the latest draft
revision to the CRMP - dated 25 March 1983 - Green Hill
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Beach remains classified as a "developed" barrier beach.
The classification of Green Hill Beach and other
barrier beaches within the state as "developed" is,
again, not based on suitability for development but past
development history.

Keeping the hurricanes of 1938 and

1954 in mind and their impact on development history, the
Town of South Kingstown officially objected to the classification of Green Hill Beach as "developed" and took
regulation of development on Green Hill Beach into its
own hands.

The resultant zoning regulations were a direct

result of the federal and state governments failure to
meet local needs.

The State of Rhode Island, with a fi-

nancial interest in obtaining federal approval of its
Coastal Resources Management Plan, was forced to take a
more general view while dealing with a substantially higher
number of issues than did the local governments.
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CHAPTER 5
THE ANNICELLI CASE

The Town of South Kingstown is the only Rhode Island
municipality to attempt to limit development on its barrier beaches through a zoning ordinance.

Faced with a

situation in which its interest ,i n preserving barrier beaches was not being adequately supported by the federal or
state governments despite their recent interest in coastal
zone management, the Town of South Kingstown took unilateral
action and on May 29, 1975 created a High Flood Danger (HFD)
Zone District.
The power of local government to protect a valuable
resource left unprotected by federal or state legislation
through zoning regulations and the exercising of its inherent police powers resulted in a landmark court challenge that has the potential for having significant impact on not only Rhode Island's barrier beaches, but also
the unprotected barrier beaches of the nation.
liThe Town of South Kingstown is in the forefront of localities nationwide that are attempting to mitigate the widespread adverse
consequences of hazardous development on barrier beaches. Because of the short history
of such regulation, many states will look to
the decision of this court (the Rhode Island
Supreme Court) for guidance, and, if the
lower court is upheld, may in all likelihood
be deterred from instituting needed protection
for their own barrier beaches."75
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BACKGROUND

On May 8, 1975 Ida Annicelli, a Connecticut resident,
signed a purchase and sale agreement with the owner of
real estate on Green Hill Beach.

Three weeks after the

agreement was signed, the South Kingstown Town Council
adopted amendments to the Zoning Ordinance creating the
HFD Zone.
On October 24, 1975 Mrs. Annicelli took title and
possession of three parcels of land on Green Hill Beach
totalling 31,750 square feet.
was $16,750.

The stated purchase price

Figure 6 illustrates the location of that

land on Green Hill Beach. 76
On November 19, 1975 Ida Annicelli applied to the
South Kingstown Building Inspector for a permit to construct a single family dwelling on her property.

At that

time, she also applied to the State Department of Health
for a permit to construct an Individual Sewage Disposal
System (ISDS).

Although her application for the ISDS was

approved, her bUilding permit was denied by the Town of
South Kingstown on the grounds that a single family dwelling was not permitted in an HFD Zone.

Section 14.53 of

the Zoning Ordinance, entitled "Uses and Structures Prohibited within the HFD Zoning District"; provides in part as
follows:
"No residential dwelling designed or used
for overnight occupancy shall be constructed
withinthe HFD Zoning District as defined
herein. This prohibition shall apply even
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if the land within said HFD Zoning District is above the Base Flood Elevation."77
At this point in time, Mrs. Annicelli did not appeal
the denial of a building permit to the South Kingstown
Zoning Board of Review, but filed an action in the Superior Court, Washington County, Rhode Island claiming inter
alia that the denial necessitated by the ordinance constituted;ataking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in violation of the United States and
Rhode Island Constitutions. 78 At the same time, the Town
of South Kingstown argued that construction on Green Hill
Beach was detrimental to the barrier beach ecosystem and
damage occurring during storms and flooding would endanger
lives and property.

In addition, the town argued that

a taking of private property had not occurred because the
permitted uses (section 14.41 of the Zoning Ordinance) and
excepted uses (section 14.42) of the property remained. (See
Appendix B)
Not unexpectedly, Anniccelli argued that the property
was best suited for use as a single family dwelling.

This

conclusion was based upon the belief that the permitted or
excepted uses were completely impractical as applied to
Annicelli's property because of the size and location of
the lot and the nature of its topography.79
"Annicelli's appraiser estimated that the
property was worth $1,000 in its present
state because none of the enumerated uses
was practical and $1,000 was, as he put it,
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the 'most anyone would pay • • • for a
spot to sit on the beach to go swimming'.
The town's appraiser opined that the property
was probably worth $8,500. However, he conceded that several of the uses were impractical while denying that Annicelli was deprived of all reasonable or beneficial use
of her property.1I80
The Superior Court trial justice found that the HFD
Zone, as applied to Annicelli's property, constituted an
indirect confiscatory taking without compensation in

vio-

lation of Articles V and XIV of the amendments to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16 of
the Rhode Island Constitution.

In his decision, the trial

justice concluded that the town was obliged to exercise
its powers of eminent domain to compensate Annicelli.

He

determined that the effect of the HFD Zone was to return
the beach property to its natural state and that, under
these circumstances, it was inappropriate for the town to
exercise its police powers. 8 1
Judgement for Annicelli directed the South Kingstown
building inspector to issue the required building permit
on the reasoning that the single most beneficial use of
the land to Annicelli was to use it for a single family
dwelling and that removal of that particular use through
a local zoning restriction resulted in an unconstitutional
taking of private property.
The balance between the public interest in South
Kingstown to preserve barrier beaches in their natural
state and Annicelli's right to use her property as she
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sees _fit was tipped in the direction of the private
property owner.

Public rights may be protected by the

exercise of the police power unless the damage to the
property owner becomes overbearing and amounts to a
confiscation. 82
On appeal to the Rhode Island Supreme Court, the
justice ruled that although "pecuniary loss or diminution in value is not the controlling factor in the issue
of confiscation because a property owner does not have
a vested property right in maximizing the value of his
property, in the case at hand, all reasonable or beneficial use of Annicelli's property has been rendered an
impossibility (by the South Kingstown HFD zoning ordinance).,,83
However, the Superior and Supreme Courts did disagree on
one p oint.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court found the

Superior Court to have erred in ordering South Kingstown to issue a bUilding permit

to ~~the

Annicellis.

Rather, it ruled, if the zoning ordinance limited the uses
of the land to a degree where all beneficial use has been
ruled out, then a taking has occurred and the Town of
South Kingstown is required to properly compensate the
Annicellis.

It further directed that a hearing be held

to determine the fair market value of Annicelli's property.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE SUPREME COURT RULING

The consequences of the Rhode Island Supreme Court
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ruling in the Annicelli case has the potential for far
reaching effects on the ability of a local government to
exercise its police powers and zoning authority to preserve barrier beaches and, in a larger sense other threatened resources, in their natural state.

The difference

between "taking for a public good and taking to prevent
a public harm", as defined by the Rhode Island Supreme
Court, is subtle.

Although there was general agreement

as to the fragile nature of the barrier beaches and surrounding ecosystem, the Rhode Island courts have ruled
that prevention of construction of a single dwelling in
an area where 30 such structures already exist does, in
fact, constitute a taking for the public good.

Again, it

is emphasized that the ability of the Barrier beach to
maintain development should not be based on previous
development history but its ability to withstand and adapt
to that development.
The Rhode Island Supreme Court, in its July 13, 1983
Opinion, stated that lithe town should have exercised its
power of eminent domain rather than its police power."
Local governments have not been delegated the power of
eminent domain.
Local governments, without use of zoning regulations
such as the HFD Zoning Ordinance, have been stripped of
their power to limit development on their barrier beaches.
Their ability to justly compensate land owners along this
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high priced real estate simply does not exist.
No town has enough money to condemn and
buy up every square foot of privately
owned beach land. If a litigant wins
compensation, on what is it to be based:
the original purchase price, or the potential worth of the property if developed - but developed as what? And what
is the value if the land now becomes
ineligible for federal flood insurance?84
Financial realities presented as a result of the Rhode
Island Supreme Court ruling have effectively negated the
ability of local government to regulate development on
its barrier beaches.

As a result, they have been forced

to rely on state and federal government protection.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

Over the past 25 years, the demand on barrier island
resources has increased more rapidly than public institutions have been able to respond.

This lag has exposed an

urgent need to recognize the national interest in barrier
islands and beaches and in their conservation.8~ Despite
the rich wildlife values of these areas, their highly unstable nature, and their vulnerability to storms and hur·
ricanes, coastal barriers are being developed at an estimated rate of 5000-6000 acres per year. 8 6

Rhode Island

has been no exception to this growth in development along
its barrier beaches.

Since the last hurricane devastated

the South Shore in 1954, growth along this network of barrier beaches has proceeded at unprecedented rates.
In recent years, however, there has been a growing
awareness of the valuable role of the nation's coastal
ecosystems.

The federal government assumed a leadership

role in 1972 with passage of the Coastal Zone Management
Act and encouraged coastal states to develop their own
coastal zone management programs through the use of financial and "jurisdictional" incentives.

Rhode Island has

been in the forefront among states in the recognition of
the value of its coastal zone and, in particular, the role
of the barrier beach in that coastal ecosystem.

Even prior

to passage of the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act, Rhode
Island had passed legislation creating a Coastal Resources
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Management Council - delegated by the state legislature
authority as the principal mechanism for management of
Rhode Island's coastal resources.
Efforts to protect barrier beaches have begun at all
levels of government.

These efforts have focused on averting

what is perceived to be the greatest threat to barrier beaches - unwise development. 87

Despite the apparent recog-

.

nit ion by all levels of government of the value of the nation's barrier beaches, legislation has not always stemmed
development and the lack of coordination both within and
between levels of government has, at times, actually promoted development.

Federal tax dollars have encouraged

development of the nation's barrier beaches and subsequently
perpetuated that development by promoting extensive disaster
relief and insurance in the aftermath of hurricanes and
major storms. 88
The Federal Government has invested billions
of dollars to subsidize private development
of coastal barriers, while at the same time
acquiring other coastal barriers to protect
the fragile and environmentally sensitive
resources associated with these coastal systems. Public policy, therefore, has both
encouraged development and fostered protection. Within the last few years there has
been a recognition that these federal programs are working at cross purposes, and that
the costs of development, including the
threats to man and natural resources, are
more significant than previously understood. 89
In his 1977 Environmental Message, President Carter
stressed the consequences of continued unwise use of
this resource:
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"Coastal barrier islands (and beaches) are
a fragile buffer between wetlands and the
sea • • • many of then are unstable and not
suited for development, yet in the past the
federal government has subsidized and insured
new construction on them. Eventually, we can
expect heavy economic losses from this shortsighted policy."gO
The National Flood Insurance Program, allowing property
owners in flood prone areas to purchase flood insurance
at rates subsidized up to 90% by the federal government,
has taken away market control of development in coastal
areas.

Private property owners, previously denied mort-

gages without the necessary flood insurance, now found these
mortgages readily available.

The private property owners

obtaining mortgages for homes in flood prone areas obtained
the necessary (and previously prohibitively expensive) flood
insurance through the subsidies offered by the National
Flood Insurance Program.

The market control which had

worked so well in the past to restrict development was gone and the federal government was picking up the tab for that
loss of market control.
Although it can be argued that Rhode Island's interest
in its coastline and the subsequent efforts of its Coastal
Resources Management Council in protecting those resources
along that coastline would have occurred without the passage
of the Coastal Zone Management Act, there can be no doubt
that the financial and "jurisdictional" incentives offered
in the Coastal Zone Management Act accelerated that interest.
The Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management Council issued
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a comprehensive Coastal Resources Management Program and,
in 1974, Rhode Island became one of the first states to
receive assistance under the provisions of the Coastal
Zone Management Act.

The Coastal Resources Management

Program was, indeed, a major step forward for Rhode Island
in the effective management of its coastal zone and
established goals of protecting and preserving the state's
barrier beaches.
However, the Program does not propose to stop all
development on the state's "altered or developed" barrier
beaches.

The Coastal Resources Management Council has

found it necessary to establish a distinction between the
"altered or developed" barrier beaches and the "undeveloped"
beaches.

This distinction is not meaningful for two pri-

mary reasons.

First, it has not been based on the individ-

ual barrier beach's suitability for development, but past
development history.

Second, the protection of the "un-

developed" barrier beaches is largely meaningless because
the majority of these beaches are owned by government or
conservation groups unlikely to push for development.

It

is the "developed" barrier beaches that are not regulated
sufficiently by the Program and require protection against
development.

Therefore, regardless of the dangers presented

to the community or surrounding ecosystem, the fact that a
particular barrier beach had structures on it left the door
open for further development on that barrier beach.
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Although a new emphasis on management of the nation's
coastal zone was evidenced by the passage of the Coastal
Zone Management Act and Rhode Island's Coastal Resources
Management Program reflected that renewed emphasis within
the state, local governments still had to face a marked
lack of cooperation with respect to management of their
barrier beaches due to the inability of the federal or
state governments to adequately protect that resource.
Faced with a situation in which it was forced to protect
its own interests, the Town of South Kingstown exercised
its police powers and zoning authority as delegated from
the state government to regulate development on Green Hill
Beach.

However, the recent Rhode Island Supreme Court de-

cision in the Annicelli Case against South Kingstown has
effectively stripped the town of its ability to regulate
development on Green Hill Beach without properly compensating the property owner.

While the decision reasserts

individual property rights, it does little to show how the
public interest in protecting and preserving a valuable resource is to be upheld.

Despite the well intentioned ef-

forts of federal legislation and state coastal programs,
the local government had been forced to protect its interest
in preserving its barrier beaches and has been prohibited
from effectively doing that with the Annicelli decision.
From this perspective, the outlook for the protection of
Green Hill Beach and the other barrier beaches within the
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state appears bleak.

South Kingstown is the only Rhode

Island city or town to limit development of barrier beaches.

Because one town has now lost a case brought by a

landowner, it is unlikely that other towns will enter the
fray.91
On the other hand, recent federal legislation seems to
indicate a new willingness of the federal government to
specifically address barrier beach development.

The pas-

sage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the
Coastal Barriers Resource Act of 1982 represent an even
more sensitive awareness of the value of the nation's barrier beaches and attempt to lessen federal interference in
these areas.

Whether passed by the Reagan Administration

to stem federal spending or in an honest effort to conserve
these valuable resources matters little - their impact on
the coastal zone is what matters.

While recognizing the

federal government should not dictate what private property
owners do with their property, the American taxpayer should
not be expected to subsidize the recurring costs and high
risks of private development on barrier beaches.

The new

legislation also provides the framework for a consistent
and reduced federal role regarding undeveloped coastal
barriers. 92
Provisions in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act call for
the prohibition of new federal flood insurance for new
construction or substantial improvements on structures on
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undeveloped barrier beaches after October 1, 1983.

Although

it can be argued that new construction will still take place
by those few individuals able to afford construction on barrier beaches without mortgages, it is now those

ind~viduals

that are forced to assume the risks associated with construction in these flood prone areas and not the federal
government.

The unwillingness of banks to issue mortgages

without flood insurance will serve to restrict new development by returning these coastal areas to a market control.
The Coastal Barrier Resources Act prohibits new federal funding for federal flood insurance, bridges, roads,
sewers, economic development, home construction, and new
shoreline erosion and stabilization projects on undeveloped
barrier beaches within the Coastal Barrier Resources System.
The importance of this legislature can not be overstated.
The pattern of growth around the coastal zone and on barrier
beaches has largely been fueled by the numerous federal
economic, social, and environmental programs within the
zone.

Although private and state and local government con-

struction is not prohibited, again, the absence of federal
subsidies will serve to return these undeveloped areas back
to market control.
The outlook for the barrier beaches of Rhode Island
is better than it has ever been in the recent past, primarily due to the passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation
Act of 1981 and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act and the
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elimination of federal incentives fQr barrier beach
development.

state coastal policy has not protected local

interests with respect to "developed" barrier beaches and
has forced local government to issue restrictive zoning
ordinances that have been subjected to legal action.

How-

ever, the outcome of this litigation is less important,
at least to the Town of South Kingstown, now that Green
Hill Beach has been designated as an undeveloped beach
within the Coa s t a l Barrier Resourc es System.

The door is

still open, however, for the further privat e development
on other "developed" barrier beaches throughout the state.
Although the implementation of the Omn i bu s Reconciliation Act of 1981 and the Coastal Barrier Resources Act
protects the barrier beaches from further federal development and subsidies and attempts to treat the development
problem at its source, the barrier beaches within Rhode
Island remain threatened.

In light of the recent limitation

of a local government's ability to restrict development
through zoning ordinances, it is evident that those barrier
beaches regarded by the state Coastal Resources Management
Program as "developed" need stronger management from the
state level.

Now that the federal government has signifi-

cantly reduced its role in the development of barrier beaches, it is -t i me for th e state to tailor its Coastal Resources Management Program to fit local needs.
Regardless of the legal situation within Rhode Island,
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it is only a matter of time before another hurricane or
major storm demonstrates its long forgotten power and wreaks
havoc on the state's barrier beaches.

Certainly then, the

need will be demonstrated for the clear-cut state management program for the "developed" barrier beaches that is
so desperately needed.
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APPENDIX A
DEVELOPED AND UNDEVELOPED BARRIER BEACHES*

Developed
Atlantic Beach, Westerly
Central Beach, Charlestown
East Beach, Charlestown
Charlestown Beach, Charlestown 1
Green Hill Beach, South Kingstown 1
East Matunuck-Jerusalem Beach, South Kingstown-Narragansett
Roger Wheeler Beach (Sand Hill Cove), Narragansett
Narragansett Beach, Narragansett
Bonnet Shores Beach, Narragansett
Mackerel Cove Beach, Jamestown
Hazard's Beach, Newport
Bailey's Beach, Newport
First (Easton's) Beach, Newport
Second (Sachuest) Beach, Middletown
Third Beach, Middletown
Tunipus (South Shore) Beach, Little Compton
Crescent Beach, New Shoreham
Watchhouse Pond Beach, Little Compton
Sakonnet Harbor Beach, Little Compton 1
Conimicut Point, Warwick
Undeveloped
Napatree Beach, Westerly1
Maschaug Beach, Westerly1
Quonochontaug Beach, Westerly-Charlestown 1
East Beach(Ninigret Conservation Area to Charlestown Breachway)1
Moonstone Beach, South Kingstown
Browning Beach, South Kingstown
Long Pond Beach, Little Compton 1
Round Pond Beach, Little com~ton1
Briggs Beach, Little Compton
Ship Pond Cove, Little Compton
Round Meadow Pond Beach, Little Compton
Quicksand Pond Beach, Lit1le Compton 1
Sandy Point, New Shoreham
West Beach, New Shoreham 1
Casey Point, North Kingstown 1
Bissill Cove, North Kingstown~
Greene Point, North Kingstown
Tibbitts Creek, North Kingstown
Gull Point, Portsmouth (Prudence Island)
Coggeshall/Sheep Pen Coves, Portsmouth (Prudence Island)1
* As listed in Rhode Island Coastal Resources Management
Program Draft Revisions (Dated March 25, 1983)
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McCurry Point, Portsmouth
High Hill Marsh Barrier~ Little Compton 1
Fogland Point, Tiverton
Sapowet Point Barrier, Tiverton
Fox Hill Pond, Jamestown
Mary's Creek, Warwick
Baker's Creek, Warwick
Buttonwoods Cove, Warwick
Gaspee Point, Warwick
Nayatt Point, Barrington
Mussachuk Creek, Barrington
Rumstick Point, Bar
Hog Island, Bristollington
Musselbed Shoals, Portsmouth
Nag Pond, Portsmouth 1 1
Jenny Pond, Portsmouth
1Denotes those barrier beaches or portions thereof where
federal flood insurance will not be granted persuant to
the Coastal Barrier Resources Act of 1982.
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APPENTIIX B
USES ALLOWED IN FLOOD DANGER ZONING DISTRICT
S - By Special

~xception

Only

P - Permitted

1.

Field Crop Farms

S

2.

Livestock Farms

S

3.

General Crop and Livestock Farm

S

4.

Horticultural Nursery

S

5.

Fish Hatcheries

S

6.

Parking or Outdoor Storage af One (1) Commercial vehicle of up to 1~ ton capacity
on a lot

S

7.

Indoor or screened Outdoor Storage of no more
than three (3) Commercial Vehicles of less
than 1~ ton capacity not including any accessory Machinery and Equipment for such, where
not an accessory use to a permitted principal use

S

8.

Ship and Boat Building and Repairing

S

9.

Commercial Dock or Pier

S

10.

Utility Substation or Pumping Station

S

11.

Sales of Fruit and Vegetables Produce Raised
on the Premises

P

12.

Storage, Repair, and Sales of Boats and Marine Accessories

S

13.

Lunchroom or Restaurant (no alcoholic beverages)

S

14.

Bicycle Sales, Rentals (including repairs)

S

15.

Marine Oriented Supplies and Bait (including rental)

S

16.

Off-Street Automobile Parking Facility Accesory to a permitted use

P
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17.

Commercial Off-Street Parking Lot

S

18.

Government-owned Building (except penal, garage, or utility)

s

19.

Tent Camps

s

20.

Golf Course

21.

Boat Liveries (small boat rentals)

22.

Marinas

23.

Bathing Beaches

s
s
s
s

24.

Individual Beach Cabanas, Dressing Rooms, or
Bathhouse

....'

25.

Beach Club or Yacht Club

26.

Bathing Pavilion

s
s

27.

Conservation Lands, Wildlife Areas, Nature
Preserves

P

28.

Private Parks, including subdivision parks

P

29.

Campgrounds (non-profit)

s

30.

Indoor and/or Outdoor Private Non-Profit
Recreation not elsewhere classified

s

31.

Any accessory use customarily incident to a
use permitted in the district and located on
the same lot as the permitted use

p

32.

Any accessory use customarily incident to a use
permitted as a special exception in the district
and located on the same lot as the permitted use

s
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